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Perspective taking, the cognitive consideration of others’ thoughts and intentions, is 
supposed to decrease egotistical tendencies in individuals and expected to cause empathetic 
behavior. However, in perceived competitive social interactions, taking others’ perspectives 
may lead to a biased prediction of others’ likely behavior. Consequently, individuals might 
reactively increase their own egotistical behavior, an effect called reactive egoism (Epley, 
Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). To investigate the influence of perspective taking and social 
(value) orientation, as dispositional and situational characteristics, on individuals’ reactively 
increased egotistical behavior in resource dilemmas over time was the major aim of the 
present dissertation. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the present dissertation’s theoretical background 
including perspective taking and social orientation, both dispositional and situational, and 
their influence on individuals’ behavior in social interactions. Furthermore, these constructs’ 
influence on the prediction of others’ likely behavior is explained, dispositional influence 
according to the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970) and situational influence 
according to social uncertainty (Wit & Wilke, 1998). 
Chapter 2, “When a Purely Egotistical Individual Does Not Take the Most: Reactive 
Egoism in Disposition and Situation,” investigates the influence of perspective taking and 
social orientation on individuals’ behavior in resource dilemmas as dispositional 
characteristics in Study 1 (undergraduate students; N = 183), and as situational characteristics 




Chapter 3, “When a Purely Egotistical Individual Does Not Take the Most: Reactive 
Egoism over Time,” extends the research of the previous chapter by investigating reactive 
egoism in resource dilemmas with long-term orientation. Situational characteristics of 
perspective taking and social orientation are simulated finitely repeated over time, and the 
influence of individuals’ different levels of experience with negotiation processes and 
expertise in Study 1 (undergraduate students; N = 112) and Study 2 (business leaders; N = 60) 
is considered. 
Chapter 4 presents the dissertation’s core findings, critically discusses the theoretical 
background as well as the methodology, explicates the present dissertation’s contributions to 
the basic knowledge of psychology, and demonstrates possible extensions for future research. 
 
 
             
Bucher, C. S., Jonas, K., Naeff, S., Goetze, A. F. G., & Annen, H. (2014). When a purely 
egotistical individual does not take the most: Reactive egoism in disposition and situation 











WHEN A PURELY EGOTISTICAL INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT 
TAKE THE MOST: REACTIVE EGOISM IN DISPOSITION AND 





Egotism1 through empathy? Reactive egoism, the major research topic of this 
dissertation, refers to the increased egotistical behavior of individuals when they 
empathetically consider and predict other people’s thoughts or intentions. It seems to be a 
paradoxical concept: How can empathy lead to negative outcomes? Reactive egoism is 
described as contradictory consequences of perspective taking, the tendency to decrease 
egocentrism by considering others but at the same time to perceive those others as self-
                                                           
1
 In the following, I consistently use the term egotism (and its modified terms), except in the keyword reactive 
egoism, which is the current spelling in research. Furthermore, I consistently use the term emotional concern 
instead of empathic concern in order to avoid confusion with recent theories' understanding of empathy. 
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interested. In reaction to the others’ presumably self-interested behavior, the individual’s own 
egotistical behavior increases (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). This dissertation 
investigates the antecedents of reactive egoism in disposition and situation and examines its 
consequences over time.  
Since reactive egoism is caused by perspective taking, this chapter first discusses 
perspective taking and its integration in the broader term of empathy. I then present 
individuals’ own preferences of outcome distribution in social interactions, called social 
(value) orientation. Afterwards, the triangle hypothesis explains how others are predicted by 
perspective taking and social orientation and how this prediction affects individuals’ 
subsequent behavior. To complete Chapter 1, a section on the methodology implemented in 
this dissertation and an overview of the empirical studies presented in the two chapters in this 
dissertation (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) is described. In Chapter 4, I discuss the chapters’ core 
findings and limitations and offer comments concerning the chapters’ contributions to basic 
knowledge in psychology as well as to possible future research.  
 
From Perspective Taking to Empathy 
Empathy, a construct long studied in philosophy, theology, and psychology – 
especially social psychology – has for centuries evaded a final definition in different research 
perspectives (Davis, 1996). This resulted from empathy’s history being full of “disagreement 
and discrepancy” (Preston & De Waal, 2002, p. 1). When empathy was introduced in 
psychology, the term initially came from Einfühlung, the German artists’ and philosophers’ 
name for an observer’s projecting into an object (Davis, 1996). In the beginnings of 
psychological empathy research, the term was meant to describe an individual’s purely 
affective response to objects. However, several researchers argued later that in addition to 
emotional components, cognitive processes influence empathy as well. For example, a child’s 
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development of a “theory of mind” (i.e., the development of the ability to recognize that other 
people have a separate mind) reflects such cognitive processes in empathy. Following the 
theory of mind, Davis (1996) assumed in empathy two major cognitive processes to exist: the 
individual’s suppression of “his or her usual egocentric outlook” (p. 6) as well as the 
imagination of “how the world appears to others” (p. 6). 
After complementing the affective component with a cognitive component, subsequent 
research further differentiated between specific forms of empathy. At almost the same time, 
various researchers postulated a three-dimensional taxonomy. Underwood and Moore’s 
(1982) typology named three antecedents of empathetic behavior: affective perspective taking, 
social-cognitive perspective taking, and perceptual perspective taking. Eisenberg (1986) 
confirmed this notion of three separate components of empathy by labeling them affective role 
taking, cognitive role taking, and perceptual role taking. In addition, in a multidimensional 
approach to empathy, Davis (1980) included the same dimensions in his empathy measure, 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index2 (IRI): an affective component (subscale emotional 
concern; and to some extent the subscale personal distress), a (social-) cognitive component 
(subscale perspective-taking), and a perceptual component (subscale fantasy).  
The major focus of this dissertation is on perspective taking. Therefore, the separation 
of the cognitive component from the affective component is explored first. This separation of 
affect and cognition in empathy was established in the final version of the IRI (Davis, 1980, 
                                                           
2
 Besides the affective and cognitive dimensions, explained further in the following sections, the other two 
dimensions in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) measure an affective and health-associated 
component, especially in negative contexts, that reflects an observer’s anxiety and discomfort when perceiving 
others experiencing harm or suffering (personal distress subscale), and a perceptual component that reflects a 
person’s ability to identify with fictitious characters in media (fantasy subscale). Their connection with empathy 
will be discussed in the General Discussion in Chapter 4. 
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1983; see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Cognitive components are measured in Davis’s (1980) 
perspective-taking subscale, whereas affective components are measured in the emotional 
concern subscale. The perspective-taking subscale (Table 1.1) reflects a person’s ability to 
adopt the perspective of others (i.e., considering others in order to understand their thoughts 
or intentions). In contrast, the emotional concern subscale (Table 1.2) reflects a person’s 
ability to experience emotion for others, such as warmth, compassion, or concern (i.e., 
considering others in order to understand their feelings). Although some items in the 
emotional concern subscale (e.g., Items 1, 2, and 7) might measure perspective taking, the 
perspective-taking subscale measures exclusively cognitive perspective taking (i.e., thoughts 
and intentions), and the emotional concern subscale measures what previously was thought of 
as affective perspective taking (i.e., feelings; for an overview, see Oswald, 1996).  
 
Table 1.1 
Perspective-Taking Items in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) 
Items           
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. (R) 
2. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. 
4. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other people’s 
arguments. (R) 
5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
6. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
Note. (R) indicates reverse coded items. 
 
Apparently, the affective and cognitive components are connected with empathy. Due 
to the close relationship between (both affective and cognitive) perspective taking and 
empathy, they are often both regarded as being the same. This is mainly due to a common 
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understanding of taking another’s point of view, affectively or cognitively, as being 
empathetic behavior. Scientific research has often used these terms interchangeably as well 
(see Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). In order to separate perspective taking and 
empathy, Galinsky et al. (2008) characterized empathy as an “other-focused emotional 
response that allows one person to affectively connect with another” (p. 378) and understood 
it as a response to a previously experienced emotion. In contrast, along the lines of Davis’s 
(1980) definition, perspective taking is defined as the ability of a “respondent to adopt the 
perspective, or point of view [of others]” (p. 6). Thus, empathy might be understood as the 
reaction to one’s previously performed perspective taking. This notion is supported by 
Eisenberg (1991) saying that empathy is frequently viewed as “stemming from perspective-
taking activities” (p. 274). Furthermore, Davis demonstrated that affective and cognitive 
perspective taking are independent of each other but also that both contribute individually to 
empathy at the same time and are necessary antecedents to emotional experience, which in 
Oswald’s (1996) terminology is understood as empathy. 
 
Table 1.2 
Emotional Concern Items in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) 
Items           
1. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. 
2. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them. (R) 
3. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
4. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
5. Sometimes I don’t feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. (R) 
6. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (R) 
7. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
Note. (R) indicates reverse coded items. 
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From the point of view of empathy research, both affective and cognitive perspective 
taking are seen as a mediator for development of empathy and altruism (Batson et al., 1995; 
Underwood & Moore, 1982). Batson et al. (1995) defined empathy as “other-oriented feelings 
congruent with the perceived welfare of another individual” (p. 621). In line with empathy 
research and the “empathy-altruism hypothesis” (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & 
Birch, 1981; see also Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1991), empathy leads people to behave 
more altruistically (Batson et al. 1995; Batson & Moran, 1999); altruism is understood as 
“actions intended to benefit” (Batson & Powell, 2003, p. 463) others more than oneself. As 
Batson postulated in the empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathy causes the individual’s 
altruistic motivation, which is “directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of 
the person in need” (Batson et al., 1991, p. 413) and is supposed to lead to helping or 
prosocial behavior (for an overview, see Batson & Powell, 2003). 
However, reconsidering Batson’s definition of empathy, it remains rather unclear as to 
whether other-oriented feelings really reflect empathy, or whether they rather correspond to 
affective perspective taking. Later, Batson and Moran (1999) modified the definition by 
describing empathy as an “other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived 
welfare of the other” (p. 911). This more recent definition matches Galinsky et al.’s (2008) 
definition of empathy much more closely, while also specifying empathy as a response and 
not just as emotional concern for another person. In other words, Batson’s initial definition 
considered empathy to be what was previously labeled affective perspective taking (see 
Batson, 1991; Batson et al. 1981, 1991, 1995; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 
1999).  
As a conclusion, research provides support that affective perspective taking leads to 
empathy and prosocial behavioral outcomes, such as cooperation and helping. Thus, the 
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question arises as to whether cognitive perspective taking also leads to empathy and prosocial 
behavioral outcomes. 
 
Perspective Taking in Social Interactions 
Consider the following two examples: on a winter day you see someone slip on the 
ice; in a poker game a fellow player raises (increases the bet). Although the content of these 
two situations differs completely, in both situations it is possible to take the person’s 
perspective – with different consequences of perspective taking. 
A first difference between the two situations is the presumable affective influence of 
perspective taking. In example of a person slipping on the ice, you could potentially consider 
the person’s need cognitively. However, you are much more likely to be emotionally 
concerned for the person – the person might have been injured. Therefore, choosing to assist 
the person will presumably be caused by your affective arousal and becoming emotionally 
concerned. In contrast, in the poker game example, you are much more likely to assess the 
player’s intentions cognitively. In other words, the winter day example requires more 
affective perspective taking, whereas the poker game example requires more cognitive 
perspective taking.  
As explained in the empathy-altruism hypothesis, affective perspective taking causes 
empathy and prosocial behavioral outcomes. For cognitive perspective taking, research also 
provides evidence that such prosocial behavioral outcomes result. For example, considering 
others’ thoughts decreases the stereotyping of others (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005), 
decreases the expression of stereotypes and accessibility to stereotypes, and prevents favoring 
of the ingroup (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Furthermore, cognitive perspective taking 
prevents the maintenance of stereotypes by processing stereotype-inconsistent information 
(Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012). In negotiations, cognitive perspective taking 
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decreases egocentric, or self-centered, judgments by considering others (Epley et al., 2006), 
increases the accuracy of the cognitive understanding of others (Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter, & 
Galinsky, 2013), and leads to “individuation” – the consideration of others as different 
individuals rather than simply as the collective (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). 
Moreover, cognitive perspective taking in negotiations aids discovery of hidden agreements 
(Galinsky et al., 2008), minimizes the influence of a person’s first offer (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001), avoids impasses (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & 
Gollwitzer, 2011), and generally increases negotiation effectiveness (Neale & Bazerman, 
1983). 
A second difference between the winter day example and the poker game example is 
the predicted intention of the other person’s behavior. You might reasonably assume that the 
person who fell down was in this unfortunate position accidentally and would welcome your 
assistance. In the poker game example, you would either assume that the other person has a 
better hand than you do or that the other person is bluffing. The consequences of taking the 
other person’s perspective are more precise and accurately appraisable affectively in the 
winter day example than cognitively in the poker game example. 
While research demonstrated that affective perspective taking leads to consistently 
prosocial behavioral outcomes, cognitive perspective taking was shown to have contradictory 
behavioral outcomes. Besides the empathetic and prosocial behavioral outcomes, described 
above, there is evidence that cognitive perspective taking leads to less cooperative, less social, 
and even more egotistical behaviors (e.g., Epley et al., 2006). Davis (1983) argued that 
cognitive perspective taking allows actors to anticipate and predict others’ likely behavior, 
which in turn might be used in one’s own favor by gathering valuable information about 
others (Bazerman & Neale, 1983). Furthermore, Neale and Bazerman (1983) noted that the 
greater “the ability to adopt the opponent’s viewpoint” (p. 380) in negotiations, i.e., the higher 
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one’s cognitive perspective taking ability, the greater the opportunity should be to reach 
successful outcomes for oneself. Studies on empathy and perspective taking by Galinsky et al. 
(2008) showed that in negotiations, empathy (i.e., “the ability to connect emotionally with 
another individual;” p. 378) is indeed socially acceptable or even desired but not beneficial for 
oneself, whereas perspective taking (i.e., “the cognitive capacity to consider the world from 
another individual’s viewpoint;” p. 378) seems to be a highly profitable ability (see also Gilin 
et al., 2013; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013). 
In conclusion, research seems to confirm the notion that affective perspective taking 
leads to empathy and prosocial behavioral outcomes. In contrast, the findings are more 
contradictory regarding whether cognitive perspective taking leads to prosocial or proself 
behavioral outcomes. In the following sections, possible reasons for the contradictory 
behavioral outcomes will be presented.  
 
Reactive Egoism 
A cognitive change of the perspective from the self to another individual is supposed 
to be empathetic behavior. As described above, perspective taking in the poker game example 
leads to a decrease of egocentric judgments by considering others (Epley et al., 2006). 
However, Epley et al. (2006) also demonstrated that other-focused individuals reactively 
increase their egotistical behavior – depending on the situation. The winter day example and 
the poker game example demonstrate that consequences of perspective taking not only depend 
on personality characteristics (e.g., measured by the IRI; Davis, 1980) but also are influenced 
or even forced by the situation. 
On a winter day, affectively taking everyone’s perspective in order to provide 
assistance would tend more to generate costs than garner any benefits for the helper at all. 
Therefore, taking others’ perspective is not necessarily beneficial for oneself. In a poker 
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game, however, the benefits of cognitive perspective taking (e.g., to identify bluffs) might 
exceed the costs. Due to the competitive nature of the poker game, other players are likely 
assumed to be competitive. As a consequence of others’ predicted competitiveness one’s own 
behavior might reactively become even more egotistical (Epley et al., 2006; see also Pierce et 
al., 2013). This resulting effect of increased egotistical behavior in (assumed) competitive 
social interactions, due to the others’ predicted self-interested behavior, is called reactive 
egoism (Epley et al., 2006). 
 
Social Orientation 
In social interactions, individuals have their own preferences whether they like to 
compete or to cooperate (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Lange & De Dreu, 2001). This 
preference for the allocation of outcomes between oneself and another individual is known as 
social (value) orientation (McClintock, 1978; Van Lange, 1999; see also Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968). In the research on social orientation, four types of social 
preferences have been defined and characterized in two separate higher-level categories, 
prosocial and proself. 
Since prosocial individuals’ focus and interest is on the joint outcome of oneself and 
other individuals, both the cooperative orientation and the altruistic orientation comprise the 
prosocial orientation. In a cooperative orientation, the goal is to maximize outcomes of all 
individuals (joint outcome); in an altruistic orientation, the goal is to maximize outcomes of 
other individuals. In contrast, proself individuals’ focus and interest is on their own outcome 
and is therefore self-oriented. Both the competitive orientation and the individualistic 
orientation comprise the proself orientation. In a competitive orientation, the goal is to 
maximize outcome differences between oneself and others; in an individualistic orientation, 
the goal is to maximize one’s own outcomes (Van Lange, 1999, 2000; Van Lange, Liebrand, 
11 
 
& Kuhlman, 1990; see also Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 
2008). Since prosocial individuals include others in their social preference for outcome 
distribution, these individuals are predicted to take others’ perspective due to their higher 
perspective-taking abilities. In contrast, since proself individuals exclude others from their 
socially preferred outcome allocation and at the same time focus solely on their own 
individual interests, these individuals are expected to take others’ perspective to a smaller 
degree. 
The most common measure of dispositional social orientation, the Triple-Dominance 
Measure of Social Values (TDMSV; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), adopts 
the structure of forced-choice items in matrices by providing individuals with nine items in 
which points must be allocated on one’s own behalf and another person’s (see Table 1.3). An 
individual can be classified as being either prosocial, individualistic, or competitive. The 
extent of an individual’s behavior being cooperative or competitive therefore depends on the 
individual’s disposition (i.e., personality). However, as illustrated in the poker game example, 
cooperation and competition might also depend on the individual’s interpretation of the 
situational characteristics of negotiations (i.e., situation).  
In social interactions, the situation itself can be induced to be either cooperative or 
competitive, according to the structure of the task (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). 
Usually, the task structure is manipulated by instruction or incentive structure, as reviewed by 
De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon (2000). The above presented winter day example is likely to be 
indifferent concerning cooperation and competition because of the situation’s absence of an 
incentive structure. In contrast, the poker game example describes a competitive situation in 
which the situation’s competitiveness is salient by the presence of the incentive structure; i.e., 






Matrices (Items) in the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange et al., 1997) 
  
A B C 
1) You get 480 540 480 
 Other gets 80 280 480 
2) You get 560 500 500 
 Other gets 300 500 100 
3) You get 520 520 580 
 Other gets 520 120 320 
4) You get 500 560 490 
 Other gets 100 200 490 
5) You get 560 500 490 
 Other gets 300 500 90 
6) You get 500 500 570 
 Other gets 500 100 300 
7) You get 510 560 510 
 Other gets 510 300 110 
8) You get 550 500 500 
 Other gets 300 100 500 
9) You get 480 490 520 
 Other gets 100 490 300 
Note. A, B, & C are forced-choice items. Values represent points that need to be allocated. Classification of an individual is 
made for six or more consistent choices. Prosocial choices are 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, 9b; individualistic choices are 1b, 
2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9c; and competitive choices are 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, 9a. 
 
So far, the possible influence of perspective taking as well as social orientation, in 
disposition and situation, on individuals’ behavior in social interactions has been explained. In 




The “triangle” hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970b) considers the mechanisms of 
how individuals predict others’ intentions and behavior depending on their dispositional 
perspective taking and their dispositional social orientation. According to Kelley and 
Stahelski (1970a), “it is important … to know what the other [ones’] intentions are” (p. 379) – 
particularly in social interactions with interdependence and divergent interests among 
individuals (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970c). 
In their triangle hypothesis, Kelley and Stahelski (1970b) argue that individuals may 
be categorized along two different types of personality: a cooperative personality (i.e., trying 
to maximize joint outcomes for oneself and others), and a competitive personality (i.e., trying 
to maximize own outcomes). Furthermore, these two different personality types are predicted 
to have different views of and beliefs about others, especially of others’ cooperative or 
competitive intention, resulting from their previous experience in social interactions (Kelley 
& Stahelski, 1970b). Negotiations with two competitive individuals result in full competition, 
irrespective of the prediction of the others’ intention. In contrast, (mutual) cooperation is only 
possible in negotiations with two cooperative individuals.  
Van Lange (1992) concluded that competitive individuals “assume that others are 
primarily competitive” (p. 372), whereas cooperative individuals “assume that others are 
either cooperative or competitive” (p. 372). Competitors are defined as self-focused and are 
therefore predicted to show less perspective taking. Even if they take others’ perspective to 
some extent, competitors experience affirmation because they “observe mostly non-
cooperative behavior from their interactions partners” (Aksoy & Weesie, 2012, p. 45). In 
contrast, cooperators consider other individuals by taking others’ perspective and are 
supposed to be more sensitive in predicting others’ cooperation or competitiveness (Weingart, 
Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). 
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These conclusions by Van Lange (1992) are in line with the research on the “false 
consensus bias” (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). The false consensus bias explains the false 
prediction that other individuals have the same social orientation and show the same behavior 
as oneself, regardless of others’ actual social orientation (Aksoy & Weesie, 2012). Studies by 
Iedema and Poppe (1994, 1995, 1999) also showed that beliefs about others’ cooperation or 
competitiveness depend primarily on one’s cooperative or competitive personality. 
 
Social Uncertainty 
As described in the false consensus bias, cooperators are more likely to expect other 
individuals to cooperate. However, Van Lange (1992) demonstrated that cooperators are less 
confident about others’ social orientation than competitors are: Cooperators might 
alternatively predict others to be competitive. Consequently, uncertainty exists for cooperators 
as to whether the other individuals will cooperate or not. According to Wit and Wilke (1998), 
this particular insecurity concerning whether the other negotiators will cooperate is called 
social uncertainty. 
From competitors’ perspective, social uncertainty does not exist. As stated in the 
triangle hypothesis, a competitor predicts other negotiators to be competitive only, since a 
competitor’s goal is not affected by others’ behavior. In this case, whether the other 
negotiators are competitive or cooperative becomes irrelevant for the competitor. Even if the 
other negotiators were cooperative, mutual cooperation is no longer possible, and, as a 
consequence, cooperators’ strategy becomes competitive, too. 
From cooperators’ perspective, social uncertainty is a possible threat. Due to 
interdependence with others, mutual cooperation not only depends on the cooperator’s 
behavior but also on others’ cooperative behavior. According to Kelley and Stahelski (1970a), 
a cooperative individual might change strategy if the intention needed to be “modified by the 
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noncooperative [other]” (p. 395) or the intention is “untenable when confronted with the 
noncooperative [other]” (p. 395). As a consequence, it is the cooperative individual who 
needs to adapt his behavior to others and to “become like them behaviorally“ (Kelley & 
Stahelski, 1970c, p. 417) rather than “simply to act cooperatively” (Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970a, p. 380). 
Moreover, in negotiations where it is difficult to accurately predict others, the 
prediction is confounded, or even triggered, by the situation (Iedema & Poppe, 1995; see also 
Kuhlman, Brown, & Teta, 1992; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). In case of an uncertain 
situation (e.g., Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988), when social exchange causes 
interdependence between individuals (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and when social uncertainty 
(Wit & Wilke, 1998) exists, it is likely that individuals predict that others are competitive 
even if they were cooperative and mutual cooperation would have been possible. 
Consequently, negotiations on resource allocation might turn competitive not only due to 
others’ predicted competitive personality but also due to assumed competitive characteristics 
of the situation. 
As a result, cooperators might show reactive egoism (i.e., the increased egotistical 
behavior due to the presumably self-interested behavior of others) in negotiations with high 
social uncertainty; irrespective of whether uncertainty is caused by others’ predicted 
competitiveness or by the situation’s predicted competitiveness. 
 
Conclusions 
Previous research has shown that (a) individuals with the ability to cognitively take 
others’ perspective, (b) prosocial individuals, and (c) individuals in cooperative situations are 
more likely to cooperate than (a) individuals without the ability to take others’ perspective, (b) 
proself individuals, and (c) individuals in competitive situations (Batson et al., 1995; De 
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Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008; Neale & Bazerman, 1983). This 
assumption is maintainable as long as there is neither interdependence nor perceived 
competitiveness in social interactions that may induce social uncertainty. In contrast, in 
situations with social uncertainty, (a) individuals with the ability to cognitively take others’ 
perspective, (b) prosocial individuals, and (c) individuals in cooperative situations are 
supposed to predict others’ intentions to be self-interested. As a consequence, individuals’ 
cooperation is unlikely due to the others’ predicted non-cooperation, and, as a consequence, 
reactive egoism (i.e., reactively increased egotistical behavior) is predicted to occur. 
 
Methodology of Perspective Taking and Social Orientation 
In this dissertation, influences of perspective taking and social orientation on 
individuals’ behavior are investigated. Different methodological procedures exist to 
accomplish this. As described above, for both perspective taking and social orientation 
measures to assess disposition are available (i.e., personality). At the same time, there is also 
the possibility to manipulate perspective taking and social orientation (i.e., situation). These 
different methods will be discussed in this section. 
 
Perspective Taking 
To assess dispositional empathy and perspective taking, different measures exist. Early 
measures of empathy by Dymond (1949, 1950) or Hogan (1969) lack theoretical 
appropriateness or are confounded, such as the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy 
(QMEE; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) 
was the first empathy measure that was employed in a multidimensional approach to empathy 
and the first to distinguish affective from cognitive components (see Table 1.1 and Table 1.2).  
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Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) reviewed the methodology of the empathy’s 
assessment in order to elaborate a new measure. They not only attested empathy to be a 
multidimensional psychological construct but also deemed Davis’s (1980) IRI “the best 
measure of empathy developed to date” (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004, p. 166). When 
developing a new measure, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright established the Empathy Quotient, 
which is frequently used to assess empathy in clinical psychology; they tried to assess 
empathy globally rather than dimensionally. Therefore, the IRI’s perspective-taking subscale 
(Davis, 1980; see Table 1.1), described in an earlier section, is the only measure so far to 
assess the cognitive component of empathy and was used for the following studies. 
Manipulating the negotiation situation is possible to assess situational perspective 
taking. In Epley et al.’s instruction (2006), self-focused individuals were asked directly to 
indicate their decisions or to display their actual behavior, before any consideration of others’ 
intentions and likely behavior (along non-perspective takers). On the other side, other-focused 
individuals were instructed to consider others’ perspective first. Other-focused individuals 
were invited to first take a minute to think about the other individuals in the negotiation. The 
participants were then reminded that others might have different intentions and interests in the 
negotiation than they. Moreover, they were also likely to see the negotiation situation from 
another and different perspective. Finally, after predicting others’ intentions and likely 
behavior, other-focused individuals were asked to indicate their decision or to display their 
actual behavior (along perspective takers). 
To avoid any confusion between dispositional and situational factors of perspective 
taking in the studies described in the following, dispositional perspective taking is categorized 
into perspective takers and non-perspective takers, and situational perspective taking is 





To assess dispositional social orientation, different measures have been developed in 
recent decades. The most well-known measure of social orientation is Liebrand’s (1984) “ring 
measure” of social values. A person’s social orientation is assessed by using forced-choice 
items in matrices in which an individual decides on a preferred allocation of resources 
between oneself and another person (Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, 1978). The 
position on the ring, illustrated similar to a car’s tachometer, indicates a person’s social 
orientation on a continuum ranging from altruistic, cooperative, and individualistic to 
competitive. Today, to assess dispositional social orientation, the Triple-Dominance Measure 
of Social Value (TDMSV; Van Lange et al., 1997; see Table 1.3) is often used and was 
described in an earlier section. In this dissertation, besides the prosocial orientation (altruistic 
and cooperative orientations), the individualistic and competitive orientations were aggregated 
to form a proself orientation to attain the two-category structure of social orientation. This 
two-category schema is also used here to test the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970b), since we also assessed predicted others’ social orientation as a continuum of 
competitiveness (from cooperative to competitive).  
Furthermore, in order to compare situation with disposition, situational social 
orientation can be manipulated in the negotiation to be either cooperative or competitive. As 
the review by De Dreu et al. (2000) showed, manipulation by instruction is a frequently used 
procedure to induce social orientation in negotiations. To manipulate the negotiation situation 
to be cooperative or competitive, following Epley et al. (2006), we instructed individuals to 
attain either the highest joint score in cooperative negotiations (along the prosocial 




To be stringent in the studies here and to avoid any confusion between dispositional 
and situational factors of social orientation, dispositional social orientation is categorized into 
prosocial and proself, and situational social orientation is categorized into cooperative and 
competitive. 
 
Overview of Chapters 2 and 3 
The following section provides an overview of the empirical studies in this dissertation 
presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively. Further, the section describes the 
dissertation’s aims to contribute to the basic psychological knowledge by investigating 
reactive egoism in more detail. All of the studies in the two chapters were conducted online; 
the two studies in Chapter 2 were conducted using the online tool Unipark, and the two 
studies in Chapter 3 were conducted to simulate the negotiation interactively, simultaneously, 
and over time, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
In Chapter 2, “When a Purely Egotistical Individual Does Not Take the Most: 
Reactive Egoism in Disposition and Situation,” the aim of Study 1 was to assess perspective 
taking and social orientation as dispositions. Thus, their influence on individuals’ behavior in 
the resource allocation task was measured depending only on personality. In this study, I used 
a 2 (dispositional perspective taking: perspective takers vs. non-perspective takers) x 2 
(dispositional social orientation: prosocial vs. proself) design, by means of a median split of 
dispositional perspective taking. The participants in the online study were undergraduate 
students at the University of Zurich in Zurich, Switzerland (N = 183). 
In Study 2 in Chapter 2, the aim was to investigate the influence of perspective taking 
and social orientation as situational characteristics on individuals’ behavior by their 
manipulation in the resource allocation task. In this study, I used a 2 (situational perspective 
taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. 
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competitive) experimental design. Furthermore, the interaction of personality and situation 
was investigated. Participants were members of the general staff of the Swiss Armed Forces 
(N = 133). 
The aims of the two studies in Chapter 3, “When a Purely Egotistical Individual Does 
Not Take the Most: Reactive Egoism over Time,” were congruent. By simulating the resource 
allocation task finitely repeated over time, and the interactive and simultaneous assessment in 
groups, a real-life negotiation scenario was created and effects of situational perspective 
taking were tested. The two studies investigated effects of reactive egoism in negotiations 
with long-term orientation and considered consequences of individuals’ different levels of 
experience with negotiation processes and expertise (see Neale & Northcraft, 1986).  
In Study 1 in Chapter 3, an almost identical experimental design was employed as in 
the studies of Chapter 2, using a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-
focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) experimental design 
over time. The sample consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Zurich (N = 
112), participating in groups of four and simulating the resource allocation task for 10 
consecutive trials. 
In Study 2 in Chapter 3, the focus was on situational perspective taking only. 
Therefore, situational perspective taking (other-focused vs. self-focused) was experimentally 
manipulated over time in competitive negotiations. The sample was recruited from various 
organizations (mostly aviation, consulting, finance, and health) in Central Europe with 
business leaders (N = 60), participating in groups of three. The study simulated the resource 
allocation task for 13 consecutive trials. 
To focus on reactive egoism, in the first study of Chapter 2, dispositional perspective 
taking and dispositional social orientation were assessed without manipulation of situational 
characteristics in the resource allocation task. In contrast, in the following three studies, the 
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occurrence of reactive egoism was investigated by the manipulation of situational perspective 
taking and situational social orientation. The two studies in Chapter 3 examined effects of 
reactive egoism over time. Moreover, in the second study of this chapter, I additionally 
investigated whether perspective taking only evokes reactive egoism or whether mutual 
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The studies in this chapter investigate effects of social orientation and perspective taking on 
individuals’ behavior in a resource allocation task. The research question is whether reactive 
egoism, the reactively increased egotistical behavior through taking others’ perspective, is 
caused by personality or the situation. In Study 1, social orientation and perspective taking are 
operationalized as dispositional factors, in Study 2 as situational factors. In Study 1, 
undergraduate students (N = 183) acted as representatives of an association in a resource 
allocation task. The findings showed both dispositions to influence individuals’ behavior; 
prosocial individuals and perspective takers cooperated significantly more than proself 
individuals and non-perspective takers did. In Study 2, the resource allocation task was 
simultaneously performed by leadership-experienced members of the Armed Forces (N = 
133). The findings showed that perspective taking and social orientation as situational 
characteristics influenced individuals’ behavior, and caused reactive egoism in other-focused 
individuals. 





A “mackerel war” is going on in the North-East Atlantic Ocean. Debates and conflicts 
on fishing quotas of mackerels have become a mackerel war (Seidler, 2013). On the one hand, 
all the involved parties’ (i.e., Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway, and the EU) interests are to 
increase harvesting and consequently to increase profit for their own economy, or to maintain 
current levels of harvest to maintain their own profit. However, on the other hand, increased 
harvesting of mackerels leads to a reduction of the fish population and, in the worst case, to its 
depletion. At the moment, the harvest of many fish is far too high – not only of mackerels. 
Therefore, in 2012 the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2012) suggested a 
drastic reduction of harvesting. 
The current research investigates whether the effect of reactive egoism – reactively 
increased egotistical behavior through taking others’ perspective (Epley, Caruso, & 
Bazerman, 2006) – is a potential source of conflict in social dilemmas, and whether reactive 
egoism is caused by dispositional or situational characteristics. 
 
Social Dilemmas 
This sort of social dilemma, in which resources are allowed to be used or to be taken 
from a common pool, is called a commons dilemma or resource dilemma (Wade-Benzoni, 
Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Despite the resource being available for harvest, it is finite 
and must be managed to prevent its depletion. Most resources are scarce to begin with, and 
those resources that seem unlimited (e.g., water, air, or soil) see their use regulated by 
institutions, rendering them scarce through regulation. This scarcity increases due to the long 
lengths of time needed to develop the resource or due to their extensive demand and use (e.g., 
oil, wood, or energy). Since the maintenance of the resource is essential in resource dilemmas, 
conflicts may arise due to diverging interests between the individual and the collective (Van 
Dijk, De Cremer, Mulder, & Stouten, 2008).  
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As the mackerel war example shows, short-term self-interest in increased profits by 
maximizing the harvest of mackerels is in conflict with long-term collective interest in 
maintenance of the mackerel population of maximizing joint profit. This dilemma arises from 
the differing incentive structures within the negotiation. Choosing self-interested strategies to 
increase the highest individual gain leads to poorer overall outcomes for all individuals 
involved and possibly leads to a depletion of the resource. Thus, to reach the highest joint 
outcome, each individual involved in the negotiation must be relied upon to choose strategies 
that result in lower individual outcomes.  
According to Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004), two characteristics of social 
dilemmas can be defined. First, individual gain is higher when making self-interested, or even 
selfish, choices than when making cooperative choices, regardless of what the other 
participants choose to do. For Iceland and the Faroe Islands, the self-interested choice of 
increased mackerel harvesting has led to a higher income. However, Norway and the EU 
chose to react to this overharvesting, as they saw it affecting their self-interests. Second, when 
the individuals involved make self-interested choices, every individual subsequently receives 
less. As Iceland and the Faroe Islands have drastically increased their mackerel harvest, they 
have decreased not only Norway’s and the EU’s harvest and their respective incomes, but also 
their own long-term profit, since the future mackerel population will have been decreased by 
overfishing.  
Individuals’ strategies are even more important in negotiations on scarce resources, 
i.e., resources that are not available entirely or in an unlimited amount for all individuals 
involved (e.g., Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). Wade-Benzoni et al. (1996) argue that for 
an individual, regardless of others’ behavior, more benefit is always made by a non-
cooperative choice than a cooperative choice, whereas a non-cooperative choice is always 
more harmful for others than a cooperative choice. Moreover, for all individuals involved, a 
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non-cooperative choice is more harmful for others than the benefit for the individual (see also 
Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983). These characteristics also apply for resource 
dilemmas as presented in the conflict over mackerel fishing. At the same time, the dilemma of 
conflicting individual and collective interests is a potential threat to scarce resources, since in 
the resource dilemma, non-cooperative choices made by the majority of the individuals 
involved are likely to cause a depletion of resources (Biel & Gärling, 1995; Van Lange, 
Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992), as they caused the mackerel war described above. 
The focus of this chapter is to investigate individuals’ behavior in social dilemmas, 
depending on the personality of individuals involved and on the situation of the negotiation. 
In the first study, individuals are predicted to behave in the social dilemma according to their 
disposition. In the second study, however, individuals are instructed within the situation to 
take others’ perspective and are predicted to show reactive egoism (Epley et al., 2006) – the 
effect of reactively increased egotistical behavior due to a biased prediction of others being 
self-interested when taking others’ perspective. 
 
Social Orientation 
In negotiations with interdependence, individuals’ types of motives on how to assign 
outcomes to themselves and others are called social (value) orientation (McClintock, 1978). 
In social dilemmas, an individual’s social orientation is one of the most influential 
characteristics and is defined as the social preference of allocating resources between oneself 
and others (Van Lange, 1999). Four different preferences are characterized in the typology 
proposed by Liebrand (1984) and reviewed by De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon (2000): an 
altruistic, a cooperative, an individualistic, and a competitive orientation. An altruistic 
orientation is characterized by maximizing the others’ outcomes, whereas a cooperative 
orientation is characterized by maximizing the joint outcome in which all individual outcomes 
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are summed up to reach the highest joint outcome possible. Because the altruistic orientation 
and particularly the cooperative orientation emphasize common interests much more than 
individual self-interests, they are both labeled as prosocial orientation. In contrast, an 
individualistic orientation is characterized by maximizing the individual outcome with no or 
just a little regard for the outcomes of others. Finally, a competitive orientation is 
characterized by maximizing the difference of outcomes between oneself relative to outcomes 
of others. Because the individualistic orientation and the competitive orientation focus more 
on self-interests than on common interests, both are seen as proself orientation (Van Lange, 
1999; Van Lange, Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 1990; see also Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert, Boone, 
& Declerck, 2008; Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, 
Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011; Van Lange, 2000). 
These social preferences directly refer to the distribution of resources. Another rather 
similar model of “govern[ing] the exchange of benefits in relationships” (Chen, Lee-Chai, & 
Bargh, 2001, p. 175) was formulated by Clark and Mills (1979). Their model of relationship 
orientation recognizes a communal orientation and an exchange orientation. Whereas people 
with a communal orientation are focused primarily on responding to the needs and interests of 
others, people with an exchange orientation are focused primarily on the giving and receiving 
of benefits. So, whereas the focus of the communal orientation is on the interests of others, or 
at least on common interests, and is therefore a prosocial orientation, the exchange orientation 
centers on interests of the self and is therefore a proself orientation.  
Chen et al. (2001) showed that exchange-oriented participants acted more proself by 
appointing less task workload to themselves and higher task workload to another fictitious 
participant. In these experiments, workload served as a burden (measured in minutes per task) 
that particularly exchange-oriented participants wanted to avoid. On the other hand, 
communally-oriented participants acted prosocially and allocated a higher amount of 
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workload to themselves and less to another fictitious participant than exchange-oriented 
participants did. In all, Chen et al. (2001) showed that individuals behaved more other-
interested and empathetically when they were communally-oriented and more self-interested 
and egotistically when they were exchange-oriented. The question arises though in which 
characteristic communally-oriented individuals differ from exchange-oriented individuals. 
 
Empathy and Perspective Taking 
An “empathetic” individual acts more altruistically and prosocially, whereas an 
“egotistical” individual acts more proself. However, participants in the studies by Chen et al. 
(2001) had to cognitively consider consequences of others by allocating task workloads but 
not to cognitively consider other individuals. To consider other individuals, and particularly 
to take the perspective of other individuals, is understood as empathetic behavior (Oswald, 
1996). Eisenberg’s (1991) notion that perspective taking activities are distinct preconditions 
of empathy supports this view.  
Nevertheless, empathy exhibits many facets. Work by Davis (1980, 1983) on 
separating cognitive aspects of empathy from affective aspects was resumed by Oswald 
(1996), who managed to distinguish clearly between cognitive perspective taking and 
affective perspective taking. The latter defines what regularly is described as empathy, and is 
defined as the “ability to identify and understand how another person is feeling” (Oswald, 
1996, p. 614). Research has shown that affective perspective taking leads to consistently 
empathetic behavior, such as altruism and helping (see Batson & Powell, 2003). According to 
Oswald (1996), the “ability to recognize and understand the thoughts of others” (p. 614) refers 
to cognitive perspective taking. In contrast to affective perspective taking, empathetic 
behavior is not necessarily shown when cognitively considering others (e.g., Galinsky, 
Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013).  
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In negotiations that involve social interactions and interdependence, cognitive 
perspective taking is likely to be beneficial for oneself, since taking others’ perspective 
“allows an individual to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others” (Davis, 1983, p. 115). 
Actually, cognitive consideration of others might be much more self-serving, or proself 
oriented, than prosocial oriented (Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter, & Galinsky, 2013). In several 
studies, Epley et al. (2006) showed that other-focused participants, who focused cognitively 
on the perspective of others, rated others as more self-interested in negotiations and took a 
higher amount of the resource in social dilemmas for themselves. Self-focused participants 
that had not cognitively taken the perspective of others but simply decided on their own 
attitude and position did not show reactive egoism.  
Apparently, the framing of the situational context moderates the relationship of 
empathetic individuals who take others into account and subsequent behavior in social 
interactions. In their Study 4, Epley et al. (2006) used the framing of negotiations, either 
cooperative or competitive, as a moderator to examine the influence of perspective taking on 
individuals’ reactive behavior. The framing of cooperation and competition was based on the 
negotiation’s situational manipulation of social orientation. Thus, these dispositional social 
preferences may possibly be manipulated by the structure of the negotiation and therefore 
may represent characteristics of the situation instead of the personality (De Dreu et al., 2000; 
Weber et al., 2004). 
 
Prediction of Others 
As noted above, an important aspect in negotiations, particularly in social dilemmas, is 
one’s belief concerning the other participants’ behavior (Aksoy & Weesie, 2012, 2014). 
Reactive egoism describes an effect whereby individuals choose certain strategies as a 
reaction to their prediction of others’ intentions and respective behavior in a social interaction, 
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and particularly in interactions with interdependence (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; 
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Therefore, to consider others’ social orientation before starting a 
negotiation can be good advice. At the same time, as seen in the effect of reactive egoism, the 
prediction concerning others’ behavior may not always be accurate and might mislead one’s 
own behavior in return.  
According to the “triangle” hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), individuals can be 
categorized as either cooperators or as competitors. The triangle hypothesis assumes that 
competitors predict others to be competitive only, whereas cooperators predict that others are 
cooperative or competitive. According to Aksoy and Weesie (2012, 2014), in negotiations 
including both a cooperator and a competitor, competitors choose only a non-cooperative 
strategy, since that is their social orientation, whereas cooperators’ strategy is dependent of 
others’ behavior. This particular insecurity concerning whether the others will cooperate is 
called social uncertainty (Wit & Wilke, 1998). 
 From competitors’ perspective, social uncertainty does not exist. Whether the other 
negotiators are competitive or cooperative becomes irrelevant for the competitor. Even if the 
other negotiators were cooperative, mutual cooperation is no longer possible, and, as a 
consequence, cooperators’ strategy becomes competitive, too. From cooperators’ perspective, 
in contrast, the other negotiators’ intentions might be predicted cooperative or competitive. In 
social dilemmas, however, others are likely predicted to behave competitively due to 
perceived interdependence and social uncertainty. As a consequence, when interacting with 
(predicted) competitive others, it is reasonable for the cooperator to behave competitively 
rather than to behave cooperatively.  
A change in a cooperator’s strategies is even more likely in uncertain situations 
(Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). The negotiation situation itself can be induced to be 
either cooperative or competitive, according to the structure of the task (De Dreu et al., 2000; 
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Weber et al., 2004). In case of an assumed competitive social interaction with 
interdependence (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) it is likely that individuals predict that others are 
competitive based on the predicted structure of the situation instead of the others’ predicted 
personality. As a conclusion, also cooperators might show reactive egoism due to social 
uncertainty – irrespective whether social uncertainty results from the others’ predicted 
competitive personality or the predicted competitive characteristic of the negotiation 
situation. 
 
The Current Research 
In this chapter, we investigate individuals’ behavior depending on social orientation 
and perspective taking in resource dilemmas. In Study 1, our focus is on dispositional factors 
of social orientation and perspective taking. For these dispositional factors, we predict 
prosocial individuals to cooperate more by taking a lower amount of the resource than proself 
individuals (Hypothesis 1a), and perspective takers to cooperate more by taking a lower 
amount of the resource than non-perspective takers (Hypothesis 1b). In Study 2, our focus is 
on situational factors of social orientation and perspective taking. Self-focused individuals’ 
behavior should not be influenced by the prediction of others. Therefore, these individuals are 
supposed to behave consistently between predictions of others’ behavior and own behavior, 
and to cooperate more in the cooperative negotiation condition than in the competitive 
negotiation condition (Hypothesis 2a). In contrast, other-focused individuals are supposed to 
behave inconsistently between predictions of others’ behavior and own behavior due to the 
influence of taking others’ perspective, and to subsequently increase their egotistical behavior 
(Hypothesis 2b) – due to social uncertainty and reactive egoism. 
To test our predictions in these studies, we remodeled the resource dilemma by Wade-
Benzoni et al. (1996) in a symmetrical version (i.e., identical interests in outcomes among 
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individuals). The fully online conducted resource allocation task is the same in Study 1 and 







In Study 1, we first investigate the effects of dispositional social orientation and 
dispositional perspective taking on individuals’ behavior, measured as the amount of the 
resource taken in a resource allocation task. We suppose that perspective takers and 
individuals with a prosocial orientation both have the motivation to take others’ perspective 
into account and to consider others’ intentions. Although these two personality characteristics 
originate from different fields of psychological research, both constructs are supposed to 
result in the same behavioral outcome in resource dilemmas. For dispositional social 
orientation, we predict that prosocial individuals will take less of the resource (cooperate 
more) than proself individuals do, since prosocials’ primary goal is to reach a maximum joint 
outcome, and they are therefore more willing to cooperate with their negotiation partners 
(Hypothesis 1a). For dispositional perspective taking, we predict that perspective takers will 
take less of the resource (cooperate more) than non-perspective takers do, since their 
consideration of others leads perspective takers to reduce self-interests (Hypothesis 1b).  
 
Method 
Participants. In total, 183 undergraduate students (M = 23.3 years, SD = 5.9 years) at 
the University of Zurich completed an online questionnaire and a resource allocation task. 
The sample consisted mostly of women participants (women: n = 154, 84.2%; men: n = 29, 
15.8%). 
Design. We used a 2 (dispositional social orientation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 
(dispositional perspective taking: perspective takers vs. non-perspective takers) design, by 
means of a median split of dispositional perspective taking. 
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Procedure. Participants started the study, which was conducted in German, by 
opening the online link in the invitation e-mail. After reading general information about the 
study, participants first completed a personality questionnaire that included measures of 
dispositional social orientation and dispositional perspective taking. Next, participants 
completed a resource allocation task. Afterwards, demographic and control variables were 
assessed. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed on the intent of the study. 
Resource allocation task. After completing questionnaires on personality 
characteristics, participants received general information about the resource dilemma. The 
task used in Study 1 was adopted from Wade-Benzoni et al. (1996) and represents a resource 
allocation task concerning the harvesting of fish (measured in metric tons). We computed a 
symmetrical online version of the dilemma in which all four fishery associations are equal in 
business size, economic return, equipment, and employees. Each participant acted in the role 
of an association’s representative. Participants were told that the resource allocation task 
included four fishery associations. Whereas the task was remodeled concerning the 
information provided, the task followed the structure by Wade-Benzoni et al. (1996). The 
instruction briefed participants to maximize individual profit for their individual fishery 
association but at the same time to maintain the level of the resource and thus to avoid its 
depletion. The starting level of harvest for all four associations involved is at their maximum 
capacity. To reach a sustainable harvesting level, a reduction of the consumption of all four 
associations by half is necessary. This prevents overharvesting and the consequent depletion 
of the resource. At the same time, the associations need to take at least one-fifth of their 
capacity to stay in business.  
Participants were instructed to make decisions concerning the resource harvesting as 
the association’s representative. First, general information about the setting of the resource 
allocation task was provided. Second, information about their own fishery association was 
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shown, including information about their current business activities, equipment, and 
employees. Third, detailed information about the other three fishery associations was 
displayed, including, in a short summary, the same information as for the participant’s own 
association. Then, participants had to indicate the amount of the resource to take for the next 
year, in other words, the next year’s harvest by their own association (in metric tons). Because 
the entire procedure was online, participants had no knowledge of the other participants or 
with whom they were fictitiously negotiating. 
Measures. 
Social orientation. Dispositional social orientation was assessed by the Triple-
Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), 
including nine decision tasks in which participants were instructed to choose one of three 
different allocation distributions, labeled A, B, and C in the matrix. These distributions of 
values are arranged in matrices reflecting points that are to be allocated to oneself and to 
another person. The three different choices match the three different social preferences. The 
choice for highest total amount of the two values (maximizing joint outcome) reflects a 
prosocial preference, the choice for highest single value for oneself (maximizing own 
outcome) reflects an individualistic preference, and the choice for highest difference of the 
value for oneself compared to the value of the other (maximizing relative outcome) reflects a 
competitive preference. Each choice in a matrix was presented on a single page. 
 To categorize participants according to one of the three social preferences, six of the 
nine choices needed to be consistent. If fewer than six choices were consistent, participants 
were not categorized. For subsequent analysis concerning dispositional social orientation, 
these participants were not considered. In the overall sample, 100 participants (54.6%) were 
categorized as prosocial, 48 participants (26.2%) as individualistic, and 10 participants (5.5%) 
as competitive. The remaining 25 participants (13.7%) made five or fewer consistent choices 
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and therefore could not be assigned to one of the three categories. For the subsequent analysis, 
58 participants (36.7%) categorized either as individualistic or as competitive comprised the 
proself category. 
Perspective taking. Dispositional perspective taking was assessed using the 
perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). This subscale 
consists of seven items; an example item is: “I try to look at everybody’s side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision.” The response format is a 5-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). At the aggregated level, participants scored relatively highly (M 
= 3.60, SD = 0.53). The scale’s Cronbach’s α was .71. 
Dependent variable. The decision about the amount of the resource to take for the 
own association for the next year (i.e., resource taking) was measured by participants 
indicating the amount of fish harvest in metric tons. 
 
Results 
Dispositional social orientation and dispositional perspective taking. We first 
tested the relationship of our two independent variables. As predicted, the results indicated a 
small but significant relationship between dispositional social orientation and dispositional 
perspective taking (rpb= .26, p = .001). Prosocial participants (M = 3.70, SD = 0.52) scored 
significantly higher on dispositional perspective taking than proself participants (M = 3.41, 
SD = 0.52) did. 
Resource taking. We investigated the effects of these two dispositional factors in a 2 
(dispositional social orientation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 (dispositional perspective taking: 
perspective takers vs. non-perspective takers) ANOVA, with the amount of the resource taken 
(in metric tons) as the dependent variable. To assess differences due to the dispositional 
factors, we used the two-category schema of dispositional social orientation (prosocial vs. 
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proself) and a two-category schema of dispositional perspective taking (perspective takers vs. 
non-perspective takers), the latter by a median split. The main effect of dispositional social 
orientation showed that prosocial participants (M = 595.12, SD = 263.17) took a significantly 
smaller amount of the resource than proself participants (M = 715.95, SD = 273.81), F(1, 154) 




Figure 2.1. Amount of the resource taken as a function of dispositional social orientation and 
dispositional perspective taking. 
 
The main effect of dispositional perspective taking revealed that perspective takers (M 
= 581.49, SD = 265.80) took a significantly smaller amount of the resource than non-
perspective takers (M = 702.04, SD = 267.58; see Figure 2.1), F(1, 154) = 5.730, p = .018, 
did. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 1b. As predicted, the main effects showed that 
prosocial individuals and perspective takers cooperated more in the resource allocation task 
by taking a smaller amount of the scarce resource. The interaction was non-significant, F(1, 


























In Study 1, we investigated the influence of two dispositional factors, social 
orientation and perspective taking, on individuals’ behavior in a resource allocation task. For 
both dispositions, we predicted that individuals who consider other individuals (i.e., prosocial 
individuals and perspective takers) would cooperate more than individuals who do not 
consider other individuals (i.e., proself individuals and non-perspective takers). The results 
showed that both dispositional factors influenced individuals’ behavior according to our 
predictions, supporting Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. Considering others led individuals 
to cooperate by taking a smaller amount of the resource. Not surprisingly, the two personality 
characteristics are significantly correlated, even though they measure different facets of a 
negotiator’s personality (see also Trötschel et al., 2011). 
In this study, individuals’ behavior was assessed in a negotiation situation in which 
they acted according to their disposition only. There was no manipulation in the negotiation 
situation, neither by instruction nor by incentive structure, to be cooperative or competitive. In 
the following study, we consider social orientation and perspective taking as situational 





As Study 1 showed, dispositional factors influence individuals’ behavior. As 
compared to Study 1, in Study 2 we predict that social orientation and perspective taking as 
situational factors will have different effects than dispositional factors. Furthermore, the 
simultaneous presence of others induces perceived interdependence and social uncertainty in 
the social interaction and is supposed to influence the actual behavior and furthermore others’ 
predicted behavior in the resource allocation task.  
In this study, we suppose effects of situational perspective taking to be influenced by 
the negotiation’s framing to be cooperative or competitive, as demonstrated by Epley et al. 
(2006). Self-focused individuals give less consideration to others’ perspective and thus are not 
influenced by others’ assumed behavior. Therefore, these individuals are predicted to behave 
consistently between their initial estimation of a fair amount of the resource to take and their 
subsequent behavior in cooperative and competitive negotiations (Hypothesis 2a). In contrast, 
predicting others’ behavior, other-focused individuals should react by reactive egoism.  
In general, social uncertainty should be smaller in competitive negotiations than in 
cooperative negotiations. This follows the logic of the triangle hypothesis, predicting that in 
competitive negotiations, other individuals’ behavior is highly likely to be competitive due to 
the negotiation’s unambiguousness. The others’ assumed competitiveness then should cause 
reactively increased egotistical behavior. In contrast, in cooperative negotiations the situation 
is more ambiguous. Here, we predict reactive egoism to occur by social uncertainty. In 
cooperative negotiations, other-focused individuals are assumed to increase their egotistical 
behavior due to the uncertainty of others’ cooperation and the uncertainty of the situation’s 
cooperative characteristic. In conclusion, individuals in the other-focused condition are 
supposed to behave inconsistently between their initial estimation of a fair amount of the 
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resource to take and their subsequent behavior after having taken others’ perspective into 
account. Therefore, we predict individuals in the other-focused condition to reactively 
increase their egotistical behavior in competitive as also in cooperative negotiations due to 
reactive egoism (Hypothesis 2b). 
 
Method 
Participants. In total, 133 general staff members (professional military officers) of the 
Swiss Armed Forces (M = 35.2 years, SD = 5.8 years) completed an online questionnaire and 
a resource allocation task. The sample mostly consisted of men (women: n = 3, 2.3%; men: n 
= 130, 97.7%). On average, leadership experience was high (M = 12.8 years, SD = 5.5 years). 
Design. We used a 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) x 2 
(situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) between-subjects design.3 
Procedure. For our recruitment, we visited internal courses of the Swiss Armed 
Forces. Data collection took place during five sessions over a period of several months. In 
each session, group members of the respective courses first attended an introduction and were 
then informed about the procedure of this study. Afterwards, participants copied the online 
link to their individual laptop computer stations and started the study at their individual 
working place in the classroom. After choosing the language (German or French), participants 
first had to provide demographic and various military and professional information. 
                                                           
3
 Previous research (Epley et al., 2006) was able to manipulate situational negotiation conditions for social 
orientation (cooperative vs. competitive) and perspective taking (other-focused vs. self-focused) through 
instructions. Therefore, situational conditions were manipulated orthogonally even though social orientation and 
perspective taking are related as dispositional characteristics (in Study 1). 
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Afterwards, participants started the resource allocation task. Finally, participants were 
thanked and debriefed on the intent of the study. 
Resource allocation task. As in Study 1, the same resource allocation task was 
randomly played in one of the four conditions, described below. No changes in minimum and 
maximum amounts of potential resource taking were made in order to allow a comparison 
between the studies. As in Study 1, participants responded to measures of dispositional social 
orientation and dispositional perspective taking. 
Conditions of situational social orientation and situational perspective taking. In 
this study, we manipulated both social orientation and perspective taking as situational factors 
of the negotiation. To manipulate the negotiation’s social orientation, we instructed 
participants to either maximize joint outcome with three other participants (cooperative), or to 
maximize their own individual outcome (competitive). Perspective taking was manipulated by 
instructing participants to either first allocate their amount of the resource before predicting 
others’ social orientation and others’ resource taking (self-focused), or to first consider others’ 
behavior, i.e., predicting others’ social orientation and others’ resource taking, and then to 
decide on the amount of the resource to take for themselves (other-focused). 
Measures. 
 Social orientation. To test for dispositional factors that may influence manipulated 
situational conditions, dispositional social orientation was additionally assessed by the Triple-
Dominance Measure of Social Value (Van Lange et al., 1997). Of the overall 133 participants, 
66 participants (49.6%) were categorized as prosocial, 46 participants (34.6%) as 
individualistic, 9 participants (6.8%) as competitive, and for 12 participants (9.0%) no 
assignment to one of the three categories was possible because fewer than six choices were 
consistent. The 121 participants who could be categorized resulted in 66 (54.5%) prosocial 
participants and 55 (45.5%) proself participants. It is important to note that the sample 
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consisted of a particularly high percentage of individualistic participants. This may be due to a 
rather proself culture of the leadership assessment for the general staff in the Armed Forces.  
Perspective taking. Dispositional perspective taking was assessed using the relevant 
perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). Overall, 
participants rated themselves about the same as in Study 1 (M = 3.60, SD = 0.50). The scale 
showed a Cronbach’s alpha of .69, but was only used as a control measure for dispositional 
influences. 
Dependent variables. As in Study 1, we used resource taking as the dependent 
variable. Additionally, like Epley et al. (2006), we measured fairness estimation by 
participants’ estimation of a fair percentage to take for their own association in relation to 
their individual necessary minimum and possible maximum. Furthermore, we assessed 
others’ predicted resource taking which indicated participants’ prediction of the other three 
associations’ resource taking for the next year. Finally, others’ predicted social orientation 
was assessed using a 6-point scale (1 = very cooperative, 6 = very competitive). 
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis. We first tested the potential influence of the measured 
personality characteristics on resource taking. Whereas dispositional perspective taking, 
t(131) = 0.547, p = .586, did not directly influence resource taking, dispositional social 
orientation, t(119) = 1.925, p = .057, did have an additional, marginally significant influence 
on resource taking. Proself participants (M = 870.05, SD = 312.34) took a larger amount of 
the resource than prosocial participants (M = 765.26, SD = 285.88) did, indicating that 
prosocial individuals tended to cooperate more than proself individuals did, irrespective of 
conditions. Therefore, in the following analysis, we included dispositional social orientation 
(prosocial vs. proself) as a covariate. 
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Situational social orientation and situational perspective taking. 
Resource taking. We calculated a 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. 
competitive) x 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) ANCOVA, 
with dispositional social orientation (prosocial vs. proself) as the covariate and the amount of 
the resource taken (in metric tons) as the dependent variable. Neither main effect for 
situational social orientation, F(1, 116) = 1.072, p = .303, nor for situational perspective 
taking, F(1, 116) = 1.115, p = .293, was significant. However, the results tended in the 
assumed direction, with a larger amount of the resource being taken in the competitive 
negotiation condition (M = 832.38, SD = 288.47) than in the cooperative negotiation condition 
(M = 793.08, SD = 315.43), and a larger amount of the resource being taken in the other-
focused condition (M = 836.23, SD = 289.01) than in the self-focused condition (M = 789.17, 

































The interaction of situational social orientation and situational perspective taking was 
significant, F(1, 116) = 8.032, p = .005, as shown in Figure 2.2. In the cooperative negotiation 
condition, participants in the self-focused condition (M = 687.07, SD = 302.38) took 
significantly less of the resource than participants in the other-focused condition (M = 892.26, 
SD = 298.84), t(57) = 2.275, p = .027, did. In the competitive negotiation condition, 
participants in the self-focused condition (M = 884.68, SD = 299.21) allocated to themselves a 
non-significantly larger amount of the resource than participants in the other-focused 
condition (M = 778.33, SD = 271.31), t(58) = 0.175, p = .862, did. Inspecting this interaction 
differently, in the self-focused condition participants allocated more of the resource to 
themselves in the competitive than in the cooperative condition, whereas in the other-focused 
condition participants took a larger amount of the resource in the cooperative than in the 
competitive negotiation condition. 
Consistency between predictions and behavior. Fairness estimation was assessed 
before the manipulations of situational social orientation and situational perspective taking 
were done, and, therefore, no differences on fairness estimation had been predicted.4 Taking 
subsequent behavior in cooperative and competitive negotiations into account, participants in 
the self-focused condition remained consistent between their fairness estimation and their 
amount of the resource taken (r = .35, p = .006) as well as between their fairness estimation 
and others’ predicted social orientation (r = .29, p = .028), and between their fairness 
                                                           
4
 We calculated a 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) x 2 (situational perspective 
taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) ANCOVA, with dispositional social orientation (prosocial vs. proself) as 
the covariate and fairness estimation as the dependent variable. Indeed, main effects of situational social 
orientation, F(1, 116) = 2.083, p = .152, situational perspective taking, F(1, 116) = 1.358, p = .246, and the 
interaction, F(1, 116) = 1.563, p = .214, were all non-significant. 
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estimation and others’ predicted resource taking (r = .28, p = .031). Furthermore, participants 
in the self-focused condition were consistent between others’ predicted social orientation and 
their amount of the resource taken (r = .42, p = .001). This consistency between predictions 
and behavior of participants in the self-focused is in line with Hypothesis 2a.  
In the self-focused condition, participants not only rated a higher percentage of the 
resource to take as fair in the competitive negotiation condition (comp) compared to the 
cooperative negotiation condition (coop; Mcoop = 44.17, SDcoop = 21.80; Mcomp = 54.94, SDcomp 
= 25.74), t(59) = 1.784, p = .080, but also took a larger amount of the resource in the 
competitive negotiation condition compared to the cooperative negotiation condition (Mcoop = 
687.07, SDcoop = 302.38; Mcomp = 884.68, SDcomp = 299.21), t(59) = 2.627, p = .011. Moreover, 
participants in the self-focused condition also rated others’ predicted behavior to be more 
competitive (Mcoop = 3.79, SDcoop = 1.63; Mcomp = 4.35, SDcomp = 1.23), t(59) = 1.449, p = .153, 
and others’ amount of the resource taken to be larger (Mcoop = 734.07, SDcoop = 328.37; Mcomp 
= 926.61, SDcomp = 260.36), t(59) = 2.490, p = .016, in the competitive negotiation condition 
than in cooperative negotiation condition. 
Participants in the other-focused condition, however, behaved inconsistently between 
their fairness estimation and their amount of the resource taken (r = .03, p = .799) as well as 
between their fairness estimation and others’ predicted social orientation (r = .06, p = .647), 
and between their fairness estimation and others’ predicted resource taking (r = .01, p = .934). 
Furthermore, participants in the other-focused condition were inconsistent between others’ 
predicted social orientation and their amount of the resource taken (r = .13, p = .920). This 
finding supports Hypothesis 2b and confirms that other-focused participants behaved 
inconsistently in cooperative and competitive negotiations due to prediction of others’ 
behavior – induced by social uncertainty and reactive egoism.  
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In the other-focused condition, participants estimated a rather small percentage of the 
resource to take as fair (Mcoop = 44.52, SDcoop = 23.54; Mcomp = 44.33, SDcomp = 18.87), t(60) = 
0.171, p = .865, but consequently predicted others to be highly competitive (Mcoop = 4.48, 
SDcoop = 1.18; Mcomp = 4.33, SDcomp = 1.24), t(60) = 0.437, p = .664, and to take a large 
amount of the resource (Mcoop = 912.74, SDcoop = 288.75; Mcomp = 902.50, SDcomp = 239.19), 
t(60) = 0.193, p = .848. Interestingly, the effect of predicting others as competitive was even 
stronger in the cooperative negotiation condition – due to social uncertainty. Furthermore, 
participants in the other-focused condition also took a large amount of the resource for 
themselves (Mcoop = 892.26, SDcoop = 298.84; Mcomp = 778.33, SDcomp = 271.31), t(60) = 1.256, 
p = .214. 
Dispositional social orientation and dispositional perspective taking. As in Study 
1, we tested intercorrelations of the two independent variables, dispositional social orientation 
and dispositional perspective taking. We found the same result as in Study 1, indicating that 
there was a significant relationship between dispositional social orientation and dispositional 
perspective taking (rpb = .26, p = .004). Again, prosocial participants (M = 3.73, SD = 0.46) 
scored significantly higher on dispositional perspective taking than proself participants (M = 
3.47, SD = 0.51) did. 
Interaction of disposition and situation. Overall, dispositional perspective taking did 
not interact with situational conditions, whereas participants’ dispositional social orientation 
did. In the following analysis, dispositional social orientation was considered as an 
independent variable. We calculated 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. 
competitive) x 2 (dispositional social orientation: prosocial vs. proself) ANOVAs, with the 
amount of the resource taken (in metric tons), others’ predicted social orientation, and others’ 
predicted amount of the resource taken (in metric tons) as dependent variables.  
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Resource taking.  For resource taking, the interaction of the two measures of social 
orientation, situational and dispositional, was significant, F(1, 117) = 6.210, p = .014. The 
interaction revealed that proself participants in the competitive negotiation condition (M = 
982.29, SD = 265.64) took a larger amount of the resource than in the cooperative negotiation 
condition (M = 783.16, SD = 51.36), t(53) = 2.451, p = .018. In contrast, prosocial participants 
did not differ between the cooperative negotiation condition (M = 803.69, SD = 313.41) and 
the competitive negotiation condition (M = 735.14, SD = 262.76), t(64) = 0.966, p = .337. 
Predictions of others. As for resource taking, the interaction of situational and 
dispositional social orientation was significant for others’ predicted social orientation, F(1, 
113) = 6.471, p = .012, as well as for others’ predicted resource taking, F(1, 113) = 5.503, p = 
.021. Proself participants predicted others to be more competitive in the competitive 
negotiation condition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.44) than in the cooperative negotiation condition (M 
= 3.81, SD = 1.49), t(53) = 2.045, p = .045. In contrast, prosocial participants did not differ in 
others’ predicted behavior between the cooperative negotiation condition (M = 4.52, SD = 
1.33) and the competitive negotiation condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.04), t(64) = 1.219, p = 
.227. Moreover, proself participants predicted others to take a significantly larger amount of 
the resource in the competitive negotiation condition (M = 982.29, SD = 235.73) than in the 
cooperative negotiation condition (M = 762.52, SD = 321.61), t(53) = 2.811, p = .007, 
whereas prosocial participants predicted that others would take about the same amount of the 
resource in the cooperative negotiation condition (M = 894.66, SD = 306.72) as in the 
competitive negotiation condition (M = 870.95, SD = 249.62), t(64) = 0.346, p = .730. 
Additional findings: Discontinuity effect between samples. Comparing the amount 
of the resource taken of the rather low-power undergraduate sample of Study 1 with the high-
power general staff sample of the Armed Forces in Study 2, a significant effect resulted. For 
resource taking, individuals in Study 2 (M = 817.00, SD = 304.55) took a significantly larger 
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amount of the resource than individuals in Study 1 (M = 642.52, SD = 268.32), F(1, 314) = 
29.093, p = .000, did. Furthermore, individuals in Study 2 (M = 874.68, SD = 289.41) also 
predicted others to take a significantly larger amount of the resource than individuals in Study 
1 (M = 756.73, SD = 304.48), F(1, 314) = 12.047, p = .001, did. 
 
Discussion 
This study investigated the influence of situational social orientation and situational 
perspective taking on individuals’ behavior in a resource allocation task. The significant 
interaction showed that situational perspective taking leads to changes in individuals’ 
behavior, and reactively increased these individuals’ egotistical behavior in simultaneous 
interactions with social interdependence. In general, little more cooperation was shown in 
cooperative negotiations than in competitive negotiations, and little more egotism was 
displayed in the other-focused condition than in the self-focused condition. 
The finding that situational perspective taking changes individuals’ intentions and 
behavior was confirmed by the inconsistency between prediction and behavior in the resource 
allocation task. Individuals in the self-focused condition were consistent between fairness 
estimation, others’ predicted behavior, and their own behavior. They increased not only their 
resource taking (i.e., own behavior) but also others’ predicted competitiveness and others’ 
predicted resource taking (i.e., others’ predicted behavior) in competitive negotiations 
compared to cooperative negotiations. This finding indicates self-focused individuals to be 
unaffected by others and to solely focus on their own interest, which supports Hypothesis 2a.  
In contrast, for individuals in the other-focused condition, no consistency between 
fairness estimation, others’ predicted behavior, and their own behavior was found. In 
competitive negotiations, individuals’ increased egotistical behavior is due to the framing of 
the negotiation. Interestingly, the effect of reactive egoism is even stronger in cooperative 
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negotiations – due to social uncertainty. Individuals increased their prediction of others’ 
competitiveness and resource taking (i.e., others’ predicted behavior) and reactively increased 
their own resource taking (i.e., own behavior) due to social uncertainty that induced reactive 
egoism. This finding indicates other-focused individuals to be affected by their prediction of 






In this research, we examined the effects of social orientation and perspective taking 
on individuals’ behavior. In Study 1, we considered and measured the two constructs as 
dispositional characteristics. In Study 2, we investigated situational characteristics on 
individuals’ behavior, and examined interaction effects of disposition and situation. 
 As Study 1 showed, prosocial individuals and perspective takers are much more likely 
to cooperate by taking less in the resource dilemma than proself individuals and non-
perspective takers are. Furthermore, both dispositional constructs, social orientation and 
perspective taking, are significantly related to each other, as also demonstrated in Study 2. 
Although these constructs measure different psychological traits and originate from different 
fields of psychological research, there is evidence that the two constructs measure the 
motivation to consider other people’s intentions. 
In Study 2, the manipulated conditions of social orientation and perspective taking 
revealed a significant interaction demonstrating that individuals in the self-focused condition 
cooperated more in cooperative negotiations than in competitive negotiations. In contrast, 
individuals in the other-focused condition increased their egotistical behavior in competitive 
as well as in cooperative negotiations. In general, Study 2 showed self-focused individuals to 
behave consistently. They not only rated a higher amount of the resource as fair and took a 
higher amount of the resource in competitive negotiations than in cooperative negotiations but 
also predicted that others would be more competitive and would take more of the resource in 
competitive negotiations than in cooperative negotiations. In contrast, other-focused 
individuals first rated a low amount of the resource as fair for them to take – which indicates 
an intended cooperative behavior. Subsequently, however, when considering others, these 
individuals predicted others’ to be competitive and predicted others’ behavior to be self-
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interested in competitive negotiations as well as in cooperative negotiations. Furthermore, 
assuming that others are egotistical led other-focused individuals to reactively increase their 
own egotistical behavior: taking a relatively high amount of the resource in competitive 
negotiations, and, surprisingly, even a higher absolute amount of the resource in cooperative 
negotiations.  
These studies provide new insights into reactive egoism and social uncertainty on 
individuals’ behavior. To investigate these effects, we considered perspective taking and 
social orientation as dispositional factors in Study 1 and as situational factors in Study 2. 
Previous research was not able to make a clear distinction between personality and situation 
and neglected potential interaction effects (see Epley et al., 2006). For example, both 
dispositional (i.e., trait) and situational (i.e., state) social orientation influenced individuals’ 
behavior. In contrast, dispositional (i.e., trait) perspective taking influenced individuals’ 
behavior in Study 1 but had no influence on individuals’ behavior in Study 2 when we 
manipulated situational perspective taking (i.e., state) in the negotiation. Due to the procedure 
here, we are able to demonstrate that personality but also the framing of the negotiation 
situation by instruction as either cooperative or competitive influences individuals’ behavior. 
 
Limitations 
At the same time, several limitations of these studies reduce the generalizability of the 
results. First, due to the study being conducted fully online, individuals in Study 1 
participated without any real interaction with the other individuals and had no information 
about the other participants. This procedure resembles the assessment in the Triple-
Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange et al., 1997), in which participants have to 
act in consideration of other participants on whom they are dependent but whom they never 
will meet in the future. In Study 2, participants were able to influence others and to be 
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influenced by the presence of the other participants through their simultaneous assessment. 
However, there was no real interdependence and no real interaction in this study, either. 
Second, differences between Study 1 and Study 2 were expected because of the 
differences in the undergraduate student sample and the general staff sample. Research on 
comparisons of interindividual interactions among high-power and low-power individuals 
revealed a difference in individuals’ behavior, known as the discontinuity effect (Pinter et al., 
2007; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Pinter et al. (2007) showed that individuals high 
in social power behave more competitively in negotiations than individuals low in social 
power. Therefore, the difference of social power between undergraduate students and 
members of the general staff of the Armed Forces could have caused the more competitive 
behavior and the increased resource takings of general staff members high in social power. 
Whereas in Study 2 the possession of social power in general staff members is given by their 
leadership experience, the possession of social power and leadership experience remained 
rather vague for undergraduate students in Study 1.  
Third, to interpret and to generalize our results, distribution of social orientation and 
gender must be taken into account. For social orientation, prosocial individuals were 
overrepresented in Study 1, with fewer individualistic and competitive individuals regarding 
the expected distribution of social orientation by Au and Kwong (2004). In Study 2, the 
distribution of social orientation more closely matches the pattern expected by Au and 
Kwong. The overrepresentation of prosocial orientation in Study 1 might be explained by the 
undergraduate students’ early stage of studying, mostly female psychology major students in 
early semesters and probably low-experienced with competitive interactions. In contrast, the 
fewer prosocial individuals in Study 2 could be explained by the proself setting in the Armed 
Forces which might had selected more individualistic and competitive individuals. 
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 For gender, the undergraduate student sample in Study 1 consisted mostly of women, 
and in Study 2 the participants were mostly men. Considering the basic gender distribution in 
undergraduate courses for psychology major students, and in contrast to gender distribution in 
the Armed Forces, this difference in gender distribution was expected.  
 
Future Research 
 This research focused on the influence of dispositional and situational factors in 
resource dilemmas on individuals’ behavior. The effect of reactive egoism, however, might 
just play a significant role in short-term negotiations in which no future consequences result. 
Future research could examine this effect in a longer-term negotiation using various trials to 
simulate the negotiation and to assess the respective behavior over time. This procedure might 
also provide participants with opportunities to react to others’ behavior. Simultaneous 
interaction in negotiations over time might additionally provide new insights on the effects of 
reactive egoism.  
Another aspect to be considered in future studies is the structure of the social dilemma 
— the resource allocation task — that might influence reactive egoism. In the two studies 
presented here, we used a symmetrical negotiation scenario. In contrast, to use an 
asymmetrical dilemma in which negotiators have differing benefit structures and therefore 
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Supposedly due to reactive egoism, individuals in social interactions who take the perspective 
of others into account subsequently behave more egotistically. This chapter investigates how 
reactive egoism alters in individuals’ behavior over time and with negotiation expertise. In 
Study 1, undergraduate students (N = 112) in groups of four participated in a resource 
allocation task, taking the role of an association’s representative. Situational perspective 
taking led individuals in the other-focused condition to significantly increase the amount of 
the resource taken compared to individuals in the self-focused condition. Due to the lack of 
negotiation expertise, individuals in the other-focused condition were more likely to decrease 
and deplete the resource. This resulted in individuals’ smaller amount of the resource 
generated over time in the other-focused condition compared to the self-focused condition – 
irrespective of the presence or absence of fishing quota restrictions. As a replication, Study 2 
confirmed the occurrence of reactive egoism in business leaders (N = 60) participating in 
groups of three. Individuals in the other-focused condition took a significantly larger amount 
of the resource than individuals in the self-focused condition did. Due to business leaders’ 
negotiation expertise, reactive egoism vanished over time and resource taking equaled 
between the perspective taking conditions. Nonetheless, some individuals in the other-focused 
condition predicted others to be cooperative and subsequently showed mutual cooperation 
instead of reactive egoism. 




Diverging interests create the potential for conflicts in social interactions. For 
example, in February 2013, the Parliament of the European Union (EU) voted for an 
ambitious remodeling of the EU policy against overfishing in the European seas. To 
overcome the problem of overfishing in the last few decades, and to establish sustainable 
fishing, the Parliament ratified extensive reform with a vast majority of 79% (502 pros and 
137 cons). Aside from prohibition of the “return” of injured or dead animals into the sea, the 
reform includes a limitation on the amount of fish taken. Until 2015, fish populations are not 
allowed to be harvested as long as the remaining population is at or under the minimum 
amount required to naturally reproduce itself. Therefore, drastic quotas will limit the 
harvesting of fish and might regulate the scarce resource at a sustainable level. Reduced 
harvests at a sustainable level would lower profits in the following years but increase overall 
profits over time. Not surprisingly, however, this reform is a potential source of conflict. 
  
Resource Dilemmas 
In a resource dilemma, a decision maker acts in his or her own self-interest, and these 
short-term self-interests are in conflict with the long-term collective interests. In our example 
of fishing, the allocation of fish represents a resource dilemma by inducing short-term self-
interested parties to generate higher individual benefits and profit, whereas it is in the long-
term collective interest to maintain the population of fish. Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, and 
Bazerman (1996) summarized characteristics and consequences of resource dilemmas, and 
more generally of social dilemmas, respectively. For an actor, a non-cooperative choice 
always makes more benefit than a cooperative choice, regardless of the behavior of others. 
For others, however, a non-cooperative choice always causes more losses than a cooperative 
choice. Moreover, the aggregate amount of others’ losses by a non-cooperative choice is 
greater than the benefit to the actor himself. Additionally, Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, and 
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Wilke (1992) concluded that collective non-cooperation leads to a serious threat of depletion 
of future resources in resource dilemmas. 
An additional aspect of resource dilemmas is the distribution of costs and benefits. 
Many real-life settings are characterized by an asymmetrical benefit and cost distribution. In 
the EU policy against overfishing in the European seas, the various representatives 
negotiating for resources have diverging interests. For example, Iceland and the Faroe Islands 
would like to increase their harvest taking. At the same time, Norway and the EU would like 
to restrict the competitive overfishing for Iceland and the Faroe Islands in order to maintain 
their current amount of harvest taken with fishing quotas (see Seidler, 2013). 
The current research investigates whether the effect of reactive egoism – reactively 
increased egotistical behavior through taking others’ perspective (Epley, Caruso, & 
Bazerman, 2006) – occurs in resource dilemmas over time, and whether reactive egoism over 
time depends on individuals’ negotiation expertise. In the two studies of this chapter, fully 
online asymmetrical versions of a resource allocation task, derived from Wade-Benzoni et al. 
(1996), were used. The remodeling of the task allowed us to extend the current research on 
reactive egoism in interactively and simultaneously performed finitely repeated resource 
allocations over time, including a dynamic resource – which has not been done in previous 
research. 
 
Empathy and Perspective Taking 
A way to reduce conflict and to allow negotiations to proceed is to take others into 
consideration. This behavior of considering other individuals and understanding them is often 
seen as empathetic behavior, which is defined as “a vicarious emotional response to the 
emotion of another” (Oswald, 1996, p. 614). To understand others, their perspective must be 
taken into account in advance. The point of view that empathy is simply the most likely 
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response of perspective taking is also affirmed by Eisenberg’s (1991) notion that “empathy 
[… stems] from perspective-taking activities” (p. 274). Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and While 
(2008) assert that although the two terms are often used interchangeably to describe an act of 
understanding other people in social situations, they actually describe distinct processes. 
Galinsky et al. (2008) define empathy as an “other-focused emotional response” (p. 378) in 
order to connect with others, and perspective taking is explained in terms of Davis’s (1983) 
definition as the ability to anticipate “the behavior and reactions of others” (p. 115). In more 
detail, perspective taking represents “the ability to recognize and understand the thoughts of 
others” (Oswald, 1996, p. 614), and according to Epley et al. (2006), it includes actions such 
as “intuiting, as accurately as possible, another person’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, interests, 
or concerns in a particular situation” (p. 873). 
In social interactions, perspective taking is likely to result in empathetic behavior. For 
example, perspective taking decreases egocentric judgments by considering others (Epley et 
al., 2006), increases the accuracy of the cognitive understanding of others (Gilin, Maddux, 
Carpenter, & Galinsky, 2013), and leads people to consider others more differentially than 
collectively – a phenomenon called “individuation” (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 
2005). Moreover, in negotiations, cognitive perspective taking aids discovery of hidden 
agreements (Galinsky et al., 2008), minimizes the influence of a person’s first offer (Galinsky 
& Mussweiler, 2001), and avoids impasses (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & 
Gollwitzer, 2011). 
At the same time, perspective taking is also likely to result in egotism, when a 
divergence of attitude or interests and behavior exists (Epley et al., 2006). Such as, for 
example, when a player raises the bet in a poker game, hoping for me to fold, but I see 
through his bluff. This ability to cognitively take my opponent’s perspective helps me “to 
anticipate the behavior and reactions of others” (Davis, 1983, p. 115) and allows me to 
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interpret the situation correctly to my own advantage. Thus, taking the opponent’s perspective 
is not automatically tantamount with being empathetic, prosocial, or philanthropic (Bazerman 
& Neale, 1983; Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & 
Sivanathan, 2013; Trötschel et al., 2011). Rather, “there is valuable information to be gleaned 
from taking the perspective of the other negotiating party” (Bazerman & Neale, 1983, p. 317), 
which is intended to generate higher individual benefits for oneself. This effect of 
subsequently increased egotistical behavior after having taken others’ perspective is called 
reactive egoism (Epley et al., 2006). 
 
Prediction of Others 
Coming back to the EU policy concerning overfishing, the individual countries’ 
intentions and likely behavior in favor or against the EU policy might be discerned by taking 
their perspective. According to the “triangle” hypothesis by Kelley and Stahelski (1970), 
others are predicted to be either cooperative or competitive. The basic assumption is that 
competitors assume others to be competitive only, whereas cooperators predict that others will 
be either competitive or cooperative (see also Aksoy & Weesie, 2012, 2014). When two 
competitors negotiate, the negotiation leads to full competition, which consequently confirms 
both negotiators in their prediction of the other’s orientation as competitive. When two 
cooperators negotiate, the negotiation is likely to be mutually cooperative. Again, both 
negotiators are confirmed in their prediction of the other’s orientation as cooperative.  
However, in negotiations between a competitor and a cooperator, the cooperator may 
recognize that the other negotiator is refusing to cooperate and will react by competition. This 
uncertainty as to whether the other negotiator will cooperate or compete is called social 
uncertainty (Wit & Wilke, 1998). Once a competitor is involved in the negotiation, mutual 
cooperation is unlikely, since the cooperator may become competitive to avoid costs and 
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losses. Consequently, depending on personality characteristics of negotiators, the negotiation 
therefore is more likely to be competitive than (mutually) cooperative. 
In negotiations where it is difficult to accurately predict others, prediction about 
cooperation and competition is also confounded by situational characteristics of the 
negotiation (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). The negotiation situation itself can be 
induced to be either cooperative or competitive, according to the structure of the task (Weber, 
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). As a consequence, negotiations might turn competitive due to 
the (perceived) competitive personality characteristics of others or due to the (perceived) 
competitive situational characteristics of the negotiation (Bucher, Jonas, Naeff, & Annen, 
2014). Moreover, Bucher et al. (2014) demonstrated that even cooperators might display 
reactively increased egotistical behavior (i.e., show reactive egoism) due to others’ predicted 
self-interested behavior in negotiations with social uncertainty. 
 
Social Orientation 
In negotiations on resource allocations, individuals value their outcome not only 
absolutely but also relatively to those of the other individuals involved (Van Lange, 1999). 
The social preference when allocating resources between oneself and others is called social 
(value) orientation (McClintock, 1978). The typology by De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 
(2000) characterizes different types of social orientation: a prosocial orientation is an 
individual’s preference for maximizing the joint outcome and a proself orientation is an 
individual’s preference for maximizing his or her own individual outcome. For the prosocial 
orientation, the aim is reached by cooperation, whereas for the proself orientation, the aim is 
reached by individualism or competition (Van Lange, 1999). 
The review by De Dreu et al. (2000) on operationalizations of social orientation shows 
that the social orientation may derive from the social preference of the individuals involved, 
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i.e., their personality, or may be evoked by instruction or incentive structure of the negotiation 
itself, i.e., the situation. In Study 1, we manipulated situational social orientation in the 
negotiation to be either cooperative (along the prosocial orientation) or competitive (along the 
proself orientation) in order to examine effects of competition over time. 
 
The Current Research  
In this research, we investigate individuals’ behavior in a resource dilemma over time. 
We expect reactive egoism and social uncertainty to occur by the manipulation of situational 
perspective taking (other-focused vs. self-focused). For situational perspective taking, we 
predict in both studies that individuals in the other-focused condition will reactively increase 
their egotistical behavior and will take a larger amount of the resource than individuals in the 
self-focused condition will (Hypothesis 1). The effect of reactive egoism and social 
uncertainty is supposed to occur in the samples of both studies since individuals’ decisions in 
negotiations “will be systematically influenced by decision characteristics” (Neale & 
Northcraft, 1986, p. 316), as the framing of situational perspective taking in our studies. 
Negotiation expertise and time. Over time, however, the hypothesis described above 
needs modifications because of differences in the undergraduate student sample in Study 1 
and the business leader sample in Study 2. Neale and Northcraft (1986) noted that “student 
subjects are not negotiating experts” (p. 308) and are neither experienced with resource 
allocations nor with negotiation processes, whereas leadership-experienced individuals have 
“experience with the decision-making process [but also] familiarity with the decision content” 
(p. 305).  
Undergraduate students are supposed to begin negotiations by using a distributive 
approach (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Neale & Northcaft, 1986). A distributive approach 
considers negotiations as win-lose situations. In these win-lose situations, individuals’ focus 
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is likely to remain on other negotiators. At the same time, as long as individuals’ focus is on 
other negotiators the resource might decrease or even deplete. As a consequence of ignoring 
the decrease of the resource, smaller amounts of the resource are accessible to harvest in the 
following trials. Thus, we predict that undergraduate students in the other-focused condition 
will generate smaller amounts of the resource over time than undergraduate students in the 
self-focused condition will (Hypothesis 2a). 
Individuals in a leadership position, however, are supposed to have more experience in 
resource allocations and negotiation processes (Neale & Northcraft, 1986). Despite of no 
common negotiation experience among business leaders, which was taken into account in the 
recruitment, these individuals are predicted to adapt an integrative approach (Bazerman, 
Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Neale & Northcaft, 1986). An integrative approach does not 
consider negotiations as win-lose situations but as situations where options ought to 
correspond to the needs of all individuals involved (Bazerman et al., 1985) and the increase of 
joint outcomes is predominant. In this case, the individuals’ perspective is likely to be on the 
resource allocation. Taking business leaders’ negotiation expertise into account, we expect 
them to less drastically decrease and deplete the resource in the other-focused condition and 
predict business leaders to generate about the same resource takings over time. Thus, we 
predict that business leaders in the other-focused condition and business leaders in the self-
focused condition will generate equal amounts of the resource over time (Hypothesis 2b). 
Competition and time. Since cooperation is also beneficial in competitive negotiation 
to attain the highest possible individual outcome over time, we do not expect differences in 
participants’ behavior between the cooperative and competitive negotiation condition. 
Moreover, in the two studies, the resource’s depletion in negotiations is prevented through 
fishing quota restrictions. Therefore, equal resource taking in the cooperative and competitive 
negotiation condition will be attained over time. However, without any fishing quota 
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restrictions, competition might lead to a drastic decrease or depletion of the resource and 





In this experiment, we manipulated situational perspective taking (other-focused vs. 
self-focused) in each trial of the resource allocation task by asking participants either to 
consider others’ likely behavior first and then to decide for themselves, or vice versa. 
Situational social orientation (cooperative vs. competitive) was manipulated by instructing 
participants to either maximize the joint outcome or the individual outcome in the resource 
allocation task. To control for individual preferences in perspective taking and social 
orientation, we measured both dispositions for each participant.  
 
Method 
Participants. In total, 112 (women: n = 75, 67.0%; men: n = 37, 33.0%) 
undergraduate students at the University of Zurich with an average age of M = 23.0 years (SD 
= 5.2 years) participated in the experiment in 28 groups of four. 
Design. We used a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) x 
2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) x 8 (trials) mixed-design over 
time, with the amount of the resource taken as the dependent variable. In this design, 
situational perspective taking and situational social orientation represented between-subjects 
variables, and time was the within-subjects variable. 
Procedure. Upon arrival in groups of four, the undergraduate students were invited 
into the laboratory and randomly assigned to the individual cubicles equipped with a 
computer station. The experimenter then started the online experiment from another computer 
station operating as the server. All the four participants in the group were assigned to the 
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identical experimental condition in the resource allocation task. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were thanked and debriefed on the intent of the study. 
Resource allocation task. In the first part of the experiment, participants completed a 
resource allocation task derived from a real-life conflict over fish harvesting that followed 
Wade-Benzoni et al.’s (1996) task structure. In the dilemma, four different fishing 
associations negotiated on resource allocation, with each participant acting as a representative 
of one of the fishing associations. To reach a higher level of reality, an asymmetrical version 
of the dilemma was modeled. Fishing associations varied in their individual profit formulas to 
induce diverging interests in resource taking. Participants acting as representatives first 
received information about the resource allocation task and then specific information about 
their own association as well as information on the three other associations. Afterwards, they 
were briefed to decide the association’s next year’s harvest level (measured in metric tons), at 
some point between the association’s minimum, the level the association needs to achieve to 
stay in the business (20%), and the maximum harvest capacity (100%). All together, half of 
the maximum harvest capacity was the sustainable level. As in the original task, participants 
were instructed to maximize either joint or individual profit, depending on the condition, and 
at the same time to avoid depletion of the resource. 
To simulate the resource allocation task interactively as well as over a period of time, 
several modifications were made. To allow participants to interact simultaneously, the 
scenario was fully computed online using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), through 
which all computer stations were interconnected with a server computer. This server computer 
activated the program and was operated by the experimenter. As the experimenter started the 
program, the other computers were activated to allow participants to start the experiment. All 
instructions were provided online by the program. In order to coordinate the following 
simultaneous interaction and to avoid prolonged waiting times, we integrated a time limiter to 
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indicate the duration of the respective stage; however, stages were still present after the 
countdown.  
Additionally, the scenario was modeled to be played for ten consecutive years. One 
trial represented one year and was completed by each participant determining the next year’s 
harvest level for their respective association and indicating others’ predicted social orientation 
and resource taking – or vice versa, depending on the condition. After all participants had 
made their decisions, the amount of the resource taken by each individual association and the 
overall amount of the resource taken by all associations was then displayed to all participants. 
Additionally, the current year’s individual profit and the overall profit of the individual 
association were provided separately for each association. 
To simulate ten consecutive years, the resource needed to be dynamic or, in other 
words, reproductive. Therefore, we introduced a reproduction factor of 0.5 a year; half of the 
fish population of the current year would be added to the remaining fish population, thus 
calculating the next year’s population.5 This allowed for a sustainable consumption of the 
resource over time if the maximum harvest was half of the total population. For guidance, 
participants were informed in each trial not only about how much had been harvested by all 
associations but also whether the resource had increased or decreased and at what level the 
resource was expected to be the next year. Nevertheless, there was still the possibility of rapid 
resource depletion as well as the possibility of an unnaturally large growth of the population. 
We therefore limited the range of the possible population of fish to a minimum of 1,500 
metric tons and a maximum of 10,000 metric tons. The minimum furthermore allowed the 
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 For example, an actual year’s resource pool of 2,500 metric tons generated 1,250 metric tons for the next year’s 




associations to increase the fish population over time – by harvesting only minimum amounts 
of fish in the actual year. 
Due to not having realized the dilemma structure in the resource allocation task, two 
participants were excluded from the analysis of their respective groups: One participant only 
indicated maximum values for all the dependent variables and indicated feeling not belonging 
to and not identifying with other group members at the same time. The other participant only 
indicated minimum values for all the dependent variables and indicated feeling not belonging 
to and not identifying with the own outcome. The final sample consisted of 110 participants in 
28 groups. 
Conditions of situational perspective taking and situational social orientation. We 
manipulated social orientation and perspective taking as situational factors. Perspective taking 
was instructed in each trial by asking participants either to consider others’ likely behavior 
first and then to decide for themselves (other-focused), or vice versa (self-focused). Social 
orientation (cooperative vs. competitive) was manipulated by instructing participants to either 
maximize the joint outcome (cooperative) or the individual outcome (competitive) over time 
in the resource allocation task. 
Dependent variables. Resource taking indicated participants’ amount of the resource 
that they were taking for their own association for the next year. Resource taking over time 
was calculated as the cumulative amounts of the resource taken for their own association. 
Others’ predicted resource taking was measured by the prediction of other participants’ 
resource taking. All the three dependent variables were measured in metric tons. Participants 
indicated others’ predicted social orientation on a 6-point scale (0 = cooperative, 5 = 
competitive). 
Manipulation check. To check our manipulation of cooperation and competition, 
participants responded to two items on a 6-point scale. The first item assessed the perceived 
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structure of the task (0 = individual task, 5 = collective task), and the second item assessed the 
perceived goal of the task (0 = best solution for own association, 5 = best solution for all 
associations). 
Control variables. To control for any influences of dispositional perspective taking 
and dispositional social orientation, we assessed both as control variables. Dispositional 
perspective taking was assessed by the perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). Dispositional social orientation was measured using the 




Manipulation check. After completing the task and the questionnaire, participants 
were asked about the manipulation of cooperation and competition. Results indicated that the 
manipulation check was successful. Participants in the cooperative negotiation condition (M = 
3.36, SD = 1.39) indicated that the task had a more collective structure, and participants in the 
competitive negotiation condition (M = 2.24, SD = 1.63) reported the task as having a more 
individual structure, t(108) = 3.896, p = .000. Moreover, participants’ goal in the cooperative 
negotiation condition (M = 2.84, SD = 1.41) was more likely to find the best solution for all 
associations, whereas participants’ goal in the competitive negotiation condition (M = 2.02, 
SD = 1.44) was more likely to reach the best solution for their own association, t(110) = 
3.003, p = .003. 
Preliminary analysis. Neither dispositional perspective taking nor dispositional social 
orientation interacted with situational perspective taking or situational social orientation. 
Furthermore, no main effects were shown for dispositional perspective taking or dispositional 
social orientation. Therefore, dispositional factors were not further considered in the analysis. 
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Effects in the beginning. In the first trial, individuals’ resource taking statistically 
also depended on the group, since participants realized to process the resource allocation task 
within the group of four. Therefore, the following analysis was conducted using a multilevel 
linear model (MLM; situational perspective taking and situational social orientation as 
between-subjects variables; group [level 1] as within-subjects variable).  
Resource taking. We calculated a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. 
self-focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) MLM, with the 
amount of the resource taken (in metric tons) as the dependent variable. The MLM revealed a 
significant main effect of situational perspective taking and a non-significant main effect of 
situational social orientation. For situational perspective taking, participants in the other-
focused condition (M = 964.10, SD = 217.06) took a larger amount of the resource than 
participants in the self-focused condition (M = 865.60, SD = 199.63), F(1, 28.200) = 6.155, p 
= .019, did. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. For situational social orientation, participants 
in the cooperative negotiation condition (M = 904.92, SD = 220.46) took a non-significantly 
smaller amount of the resource than participants in the competitive negotiation condition (M = 
924.78, SD = 207.61), F(1, 28.200) = 0.208, p = .625, did. The interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 28.200) = 0.000, p = .983; see Figure 3.1. 
Consistency between predictions. When comparing others’ predicted social 
orientation and others’ predicted resource taking, the overall relationship between these two 
predictions was significant (r = .19, p = .043). However, for situational perspective taking, 
different conclusions resulted from the self-focused condition and the other-focused 
condition. Participants in the self-focused condition remained consistent in their prediction of 
others’ social orientation (M
 
= 2.76, SD = 0.77) and others’ resource taking (M
 
= 820.81, SD = 
199.86; r = .40, p = .003) in competitive and cooperative negotiations. In contrast, for 





= 2.81, SD = 0.73) and others’ resource taking (M
 
= 870.55, SD = 




Figure 3.1. Amount of the resource taken in the first trial as a function of situational perspective 
taking and situational social orientation. 
 
Effects over time. Individuals’ resource taking over time depended on the group and 
on time. Therefore, we calculated the same multilevel linear model (MLM) over time using a 
latent growth model (LGM; situational perspective taking and situational social orientation as 
between-subjects variables; time [level 1] and group [level 2] as within-subjects variables), 
with the cumulative amounts of the resource taken from the first trial to the eighth trial. Since 
in finitely repeated resource allocations the last trials are confounded due to individuals who 
rationally turn non-cooperative and deplete the resource in the end of the simulation in order 
to increase profit without any further consequences (Wiens, 2013), the ninth and the tenth trial 
were not considered in the following analysis. 
Resource taking. We calculated a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. 
self-focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) LGM, with the 




























LGM revealed a significant main effect of situational perspective taking and a non-significant 
main effect of situational social orientation. Over time, participants in the other-focused 
condition generated smaller amounts of the resource than participants in the self-focused 
condition, F(1, 93.500) = 8.341, p = .005, did. This finding supports Hypothesis 2a. No 
significant difference in generated cumulative amounts of the resource over time resulted 
between participants in the cooperative negotiation condition and participants in the 
competitive negotiation condition, F(1, 93.500) = 0.430, p = .514. The interaction was non-
significant, F(1, 93.500) = 0.281, p = .597. 
Additional findings: Depletion of the resource. Since we introduced a reproduction 
factor to create a dynamic resource for maintaining a minimum amount of the resource in 
order to allow participants to negotiate during the entire procedure, depletion was impossible. 
However, an early depletion of the resource would have resulted in an early end of the 
simulated resource allocation task. Therefore, we considered depletion as time until the 
resource would have been depleted and tested effects on trials played at group level and the 
amount of the resource taken at the individual level. 
At the group level, we first calculated a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused 
vs. self-focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) ANOVA, 
with the amount of trials played until the trial in which the resource would have been depleted 
or all the eight trials if the resource would not have been depleted yet. A significant effect 
resulted for groups in the other-focused condition in competitive negotiations (M = 4.29, SD = 
2.63), demonstrating these groups would have significantly depleted the resource in earlier 
trials than other groups (M = 6.52, SD = 2.14), F(1, 26) = 2.270, p = .032, did.  
At the individual level, we calculated a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused 
vs. self-focused) x 2 (situational social orientation: cooperative vs. competitive) MLM, with 
the cumulative amount of the resource taken (in metric tons) until the end of the eighth trial if 
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the resource would not have been depleted yet or until the trial in which the resource would 
have been depleted as the dependent variable. The MLM revealed both main effects of 
situational perspective taking and situational social orientation to be significant. For 
situational perspective taking, participants in the other-focused condition (M = 2,696.99, SD = 
994.61) generated a significantly lower cumulative amount of the resource than participants in 
the self-focused condition (M = 3,244.08, SD = 985.94), F(1, 112) = 9.616, p = .002, did. This 
finding again confirms Hypothesis 2a. For situational social orientation, participants in the 
cooperative negotiation condition (M = 3,221.62, SD = 849.43) generated a significantly 
larger cumulative amount of the resource than participants in the competitive negotiation 




Figure 3.2. Cumulative amount of the resource taken as a function of situational perspective taking 
and situational social orientation. 
 
As Figure 3.2 shows, participants’ earlier depletion of the resource in the other-
focused condition in competitive negotiations resulted in the least generated cumulative 

























egoism to cause increased self-interested behavior over time if restrictions are absent. The 
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 112) = 3.681, p = .058, that is, the effect tended to 
be stronger in the competitive negotiation condition. 
 
Discussion 
This study provides support for the occurrence of reactive egoism, the increased 
reactive egotistical behavior due to the predicted competitiveness of others. Situational 
perspective taking showed that participants in the other-focused condition cooperated less by 
taking a significantly larger amount of the resource in the first trial than participants in the 
self-focused condition did. Even though considering others is supposed to be empathetic 
behavior, own short-term benefits had been prioritized by situational perspective taking. Over 
time, participants in the other-focused condition ignored the decrease of the resource but 
focused on others’ competitive behavior and ended generating less of the resource. 
Apparently, undergraduate students failed to consider the drastic decrease of the resource. 
Instead, they kept their focus on others which resulted in ongoing reactive egoism. 
Situational social orientation had no influence, when participants in the beginning 
harvested a little more of the resource in competitive negotiations than in cooperative 
negotiations. Due to the need to initially cooperate in order to reach the highest possible 
individual outcome, the effect of situational social orientation was non-significant. Over time, 
no difference between competition and cooperation was found since restrictions avoided the 
resource’s depletion. However, without restrictions the resource would have been 
significantly earlier depleted in competitive negotiations, which indicates the need for 
restrictions in resource allocations in order to avoid the ongoing competition due to biased 
perspective taking.  
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In Study 2 below, we wanted to replicate the findings of situational perspective taking, 
since individuals’ behavior in resource allocation “will be systematically influenced by 
decision characteristics” (Neale & Northcraft, 1986, p. 316). However, in the present study, 
undergraduate students participated who were neither experienced with resource allocations 
nor with negotiation processes. In the following study, we wanted to investigate experienced 
business leaders’ behavior over time, and whether reactive egoism results from competitive 





Study 2 replicated Study 1 in many ways and included the simulated resource 
allocation task over time concerning situational perspective taking (other-focused vs. self-
focused). However, in contrast to the undergraduate students sample in Study 1, here we 
examined individuals in leadership positions. Since negotiations on resource allocation are 
primarily performed by management executives, the focus of the present study was to 
replicate the effect of reactive egoism as well as to explore individuals’ behavior with 
extensive professional negotiation experience over time. According to Neale and Northcraft 
(1986), individuals in a leader position have more experience in the allocation of resources 
and negotiation processes. Due to this negotiation expertise, leaders should be able to focus 
on the long-term resource allocation and to counterbalance the initial effect of situational 
perspective taking, i.e., reactive egoism, over time. As a consequence, reactive egoism is 
supposed to vanish and leaders’ behavior to be similar over time, irrespective of the 
perspective taking condition. In order to test our predictions, leaders in different organizations 
were recruited to simultaneously interact in the resource allocation task.  
Due to a smaller sample size of available business leaders, situational social 
orientation was kept competitive, by instructing participants to maximize their individual 
outcomes. As before, we manipulated situational perspective taking by telling participants 
who must be considered first in the allocation task before they decided on resource taking in 
each trial: In the other-focused condition, the leaders first predicted others before deciding, 
and in the self-focused condition, they first decided and then predicted others. To control for 
individual preferences, dispositional perspective taking and dispositional social orientation, 





Participants. In total, 60 (women: n = 17, 28.3%; men: n = 43, 71.7%) business 
leaders with an average age of 44.1 years (SD = 10.7 years) participated in the experiment in 
20 groups of three. Business leaders had been defined to either require budget or staff 
responsibility. The average leadership experience was 10.7 years, with a range from 1 year to 
45 years. Leaders were recruited from various organizations located in Zurich (Switzerland), 
Frankfurt am Main (Germany), and South Tyrol (Italy), mostly in aviation, consulting, 
finance, and health. Furthermore, the recruitment endeavored that business leaders had no 
common work experience. 
Design. In this study, we used a 2 (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. 
self-focused) x 10 (trials) mixed-design in competitive negotiations over time, with the 
amount of the resource taken as the dependent variable. Here, situational perspective taking 
was the between-subjects variable and time was the within-subjects variable. 
Procedure. The procedure in Study 2 was the same as in Study 1. In groups of three, 
leaders were randomly assigned to individual laptop computers. Each laptop computer had an 
online connection to the server laptop computer operated by the experimenter. Again, the 
identical experimental condition was chosen for all three participants in the group. At last, 
participants were thanked and debriefed on the intent of the study. 
Resource allocation task. The resource allocation task was the same as in Study 1. In 
contrast, however, in this study we simulated the experiment as competitive negotiations only 
and minimized the group size in the negotiation. To maintain the asymmetrical structure of 
the resource dilemma, three different fishing associations6 had to negotiate on resource 
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allocation. Again, each participant acted as a representative of one of the fishing associations. 
To adapt the negotiation to three fishing associations, instead of four associations as in Study 
1, their maximum capacities were adjusted and the sustainable level was half of the present 
harvest. Participants were instructed to maximize their profit and at the same time avoid 
depletion of the resource. 
For the scenario, we again used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) fully online to 
allow participants to simultaneously interact in the simulation by interconnecting all laptop 
computers. Since in Study 1 the last couple of trials were confounded by participants’ turn to 
non-cooperation in the end of the simulation (Wiens, 2013), we increased the number of trials 
to a total of 13; but omitted the last 3 trials from analysis. Again, to simulate the 13 
consecutive years, we used a reproduction factor of 0.5 a year to allow sustainable 
consumption of the resource over time. The limits of the resource were adjusted to 1,150 
metric tons as the minimum and 7,500 tons as the maximum. The minimum harvest amounts 
allowed the associations to increase the future fish population over time. No further changes 
in the programming were made. 
Due to one participant responding to the initial scales too slowly, the screens of the 
other two participants turned passive, indicating that they should wait for the other participant. 
This reset the simulation. As a consequence, the subsequent simulation in this group of three 
participants was played in the self-focused condition without any prediction of others. In total, 
6 participants were excluded from the original sample consisting of 60 participants: One 
group of three participants could not be included in the following analysis, because two 
participants acted for another association by mistake. An additional three participants of the 
remaining 19 groups were excluded from the analysis of their respective group due to not 
having realized the dilemma structure in the resource allocation task, as they only indicated 
maximum values for all the dependent variables and at the same time indicated feeling not 
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belonging to and not identifying with other group members. The final sample consisted of 54 
participants in 19 groups.  
Dependent variables. We used the same dependent variables as in Study 1. Resource 
taking, resource taking over time, and others’ predicted resource taking were measured in 
metric tons, and others’ predicted social orientation was measured using a 6-point scale (0 = 
cooperative, 5 = competitive).  
Control variables. As in Study 1, we measured both dispositional perspective taking 
and dispositional social orientation as control variables. Dispositional perspective taking was 
assessed by the perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 
1980). Again, we used the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values to assess dispositional 
social orientation (Van Lange et al., 1997). Further, two items concerning participants’ 
individual and collective identity, “identification with other associations” and “belonging to 




Preliminary analysis. Neither dispositional perspective taking nor dispositional social 
orientation interacted with situational perspective taking, and neither of those showed main 
effects. Therefore, in the analysis dispositional factors were not considered. 
Preliminary analysis at group level. Initial data analysis between conditions revealed 
two groups in the other-focused condition as outliers concerning their aggregated resource 
taking (> 2 SD). These two groups were removed from the following analysis. Findings 
including these two groups are presented in the last section on mutual cooperation. 
Effects in the beginning. As in Study 1, individuals’ resource taking in the first trial 
statistically depended on the group. Therefore, the following analysis was conducted using a 
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multilevel linear model (MLM; situational perspective taking as between-subjects variable; 
group [level 1] as within-subjects variable). 
Resource taking. We calculated a (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. 
self-focused) MLM, with the amount of the resource taken (in metric tons) as the dependent 
variable. The MLM revealed a significant main effect of situational perspective taking. In the 
other-focused condition, participants (M = 1,008.95, SD = 186.44) took a significantly larger 
amount of the resource than participants in the self-focused condition (M = 868.65, SD = 
281.11), F(1, 48) = 4.332, p = .043, did.7 This finding supports Hypothesis 1. 
Resource taking and identity. Participants’ identity significantly influenced the effect 
of reactive egoism. We tested two (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-
focused) MLMs, with “identification with other associations” and with “belonging to other 
associations” as additional continuous independent variables in separate MLMs. Both MLMs 
showed a significant interaction of situational perspective taking and identity; for 
“identification with other associations”, F(5, 48) = 3.704, p = .006; and for “belonging to 
other associations”, F(4, 48) = 3.021, p = .027. Participants in the other-focused condition 
reactively increased their egotistical behavior by taking a larger amount of the resource when 
they indicated not identifying with and not belonging to other associations. 
                                                           
7
 Age had a significant influence on individuals’ behavior, F(25, 48) = 5.708, p = .000, and others’ predicted 
social orientation, F(24, 45) = 5.123, p = .000. Younger participants competed more by taking a larger amount of 
the resource and also predicted others to be more competitive than older participants did. Furthermore, age was 
correlated with leadership experience (r = .64, p = .000). Thus, the same influence on individuals’ behavior, 
F(20, 48) = 1.790, p = .050, and others’ predicted social orientation, F(20, 45) = 2.885, p = .002, was observed 
for leadership experience. Participants with lesser leadership experience competed more by taking a larger 




Consistency between predictions. As in Study 1, we compared others’ predicted social 
orientation and others’ predicted resource taking. The overall relationship remained the same 
as in Study 1, but was non-significant, presumably due to the smaller sample size (r = .22, p = 
.149). Nevertheless, the same conclusion for situational perspective taking resulted in this 
study. In the self-focused condition, participants remained consistent between their prediction 
of others’ social orientation (M
 
= 3.10, SD = 0.93) and others’ resource taking (M
 
= 1915.31, 
SD = 338.57; r = .51, p = .018). In contrast, in the other-focused condition participants again 
predicted others’ social orientation (M
 
= 3.10, SD = 0.91) and others’ resource taking (M
 
= 
1946.82, SD = 399.36; r = .00, p = 1.000) inconsistently – due to social uncertainty. 
Effects over time. As in Study 1, individuals’ resource taking over time statistically 
depended on the group and on time. Therefore, we used the same multilevel linear model 
(MLM) over time in a latent growth model (LGM; situational perspective taking as between-
subjects variable; time [level 1] and group [level 2] as within-subjects variables), with the 
cumulative amounts of the resource taken from the first trial to the tenth trial. Since in Study 1 
the latter trials were confounded by some participants depleting the resource by the end of the 
simulation in order to increase their own profit without any further consequences (Wiens, 
2013), in the following analysis the eleventh, the twelfth, and the thirteenth trial were not 
considered. 
Resource taking. We calculated a (situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. 
self-focused) LGM, with the cumulative amounts of the resource taken (in metric tons) as the 
dependent variable. The LGM revealed no significant main effect of situational perspective 
taking. Over time, participants in the self-focused condition did not differ in the amount of 
resource taken from participants’ resource taking in the other-focused condition, F(1, 
1013.737) = 0.009, p = .923. This finding supports Hypothesis 2b. 
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Additional findings: Mutual cooperation. The two groups in the other-focused 
condition, excluded due to their strongly deviating scores in aggregated amount of the 
resource taken, showed cooperation instead of reactive egoism. We tested the difference 
between reactive egoism and mutual cooperation with the others’ predicted social orientation 
as the dependent variable. Indeed, participants in groups showing mutual cooperation (MC; 
MMC = 2.17, SDMC = 0.41) predicted others’ behavior as significantly more cooperative than 
participants in groups showing reactive egoism (RE; MRE = 3.10, SDRE = 0.91), F(1, 30) = 
6.385, p = .017, did. 
Resource taking. We calculated a (situational other-focused condition: predicted 
cooperative vs. predicted competitive) MLM, with the amount of the resource taken as the 
dependent variable. In the first trial, participants in groups showing reactive egoism did not 
differ in the amount of the resource taken from participants in groups showing mutual 
cooperation (MRE = 1,008.95, SDRE = 186.44 vs. MMC = 872.51, SDMC = 324.53), F(1, 10) = 
1.853, p = .203. 
Resource taking and identity. Moreover, participants’ identity influenced the effect of 
reactive egoism and mutual cooperation. We calculated two (situational other-focused 
condition: predicted cooperative vs. predicted competitive) MLMs, with “identification with 
other associations” and with “belonging to other associations” as additional continuous 
independent variables in separate MLMs. Both MLMs showed a significant interaction 
between the other-focused condition and identity; for “identification with other associations”, 
F(2, 30) = 6.088, p = .006; and for “belonging to other associations”, F(3, 14.345) = 5.554, p 
= .010. Groups showing reactive egoism and indicating not identifying with and not 
belonging to other associations reactively increased their egotistical behavior the most by 
taking a larger amount of the resource. 
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Resource taking over time. Finally, we calculated a (situational other-focused 
condition: predicted cooperative vs. predicted competitive) LGM, with the cumulative 
amounts of the resource taken (in metric tons) as the dependent variable. The LGM revealed a 
significant main effect over time. Participants in groups showing mutual cooperation 
generated significantly larger amounts of the resource than participants in groups showing 
reactive egoism, F(1, 53.130) = 19.116, p = .000. This finding supports the notion that mutual 
cooperation will attain higher overall outcomes over time (see Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Cumulative amounts of the resource taken over time (Study 2) as a function of the 
situational other-focused condition. Eight groups (predicted competitive) showed reactive egoism (n = 
24), and two groups (predicted cooperative) showed mutual cooperation (n = 6).8 
Discussion 
                                                           
8
 Significant differences in Trial 8 (MRE = 3,747.91, SDRE = 617.26 vs. MMC = 4,718.94, SDMC = 1,829.55), F(1, 
30) = 5.325, p = .028; in Trial 9 (MRE = 4,088.89, SDRE = 699.94 vs. MMC = 5,283.94, SDMC = 2,095.02), F(1, 30) 
= 6.373, p = .017; and in Trial 10: MRE = 4,427.31, SDRE = 695.84 vs. MMC = 5,766.81, SDMC = 2,319.52), F(1, 
























Study 2 replicates the major finding of Study 1. Reactive egoism occurred in the other-
focused condition, when others were predicted to act competitively in the resource dilemma. 
Participants who were self-focused on their individual interests took a significantly lower 
amount of the resource than participants in the other-focused condition did. This finding 
provides evidence that considering others’ perspective causes increased egotistical behavior in 
individuals, i.e., reactive egoism occurred. Furthermore, identity moderated the effect of 
reactive egoism. Participants who considered others’ perspective but felt unrelated to others 
increased their amount of the resource taken, i.e., even more reactive egoism occurred. 
However, in contrast to Study 1, participants in the other-focused condition avoided severe 
decrease of the resource and finished with rather equal resource taking over time as 
participants in the self-focused condition.  
 At the same time, some groups in the other-focused condition managed to finish the 
simulation with the largest amount of the resource taken. These groups avoided reactive 
egoism by predicting others’ behavior as significantly more cooperative than other groups 
within the other-focused condition, and subsequently showed mutual cooperation. This 
finding is in line with the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970): Prosocial 
individuals who take others into account might either predict others to be competitive (i.e., 
followed by reactive egoism), or cooperative (i.e., followed by mutual cooperation). As a 
consequence, by predicting others to be cooperative, mutual cooperation led these groups to 
end the simulation with the highest joint and individual outcomes over time. 
Interestingly, due to the more diverse sample in Study 2, demographic and job-related 
variables influenced the strength of the effect of reactive egoism and cooperation. 
Cooperation is affected by individuals’ age and leadership experience (see Footnote 7). The 
younger individuals are and the lesser individuals’ leadership experience is, the higher the 
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probability of reactive egoism, or, in other words, the older the individuals and the higher 





Fair and accurate allocation of goods is an essential concern in our daily lives, 
especially in the face of ever-dwindling natural resources combined with increased demand 
and consumption of them. Nevertheless, only a minority of representatives of nations, 
institutions, and organizations are responsible for and entitled to negotiate on the allocation of 
these shared resources, whereas ordinary people usually are not. On the other hand, decisions 
on resource allocation concern us all, due to our dependence on those resources and our 
interest in their consumption and/or sustainability.  
 In the current studies, we simulated a resource allocation task in which participants 
acted as representatives of various associations allocating resources over multiple trials. The 
two studies demonstrated that situational perspective taking led to increased egotistical 
behavior in individuals at the beginning of the resource allocation. Over time, other-focused 
undergraduate students in Study 1 failed to realize the resource’s decrease and ended up with 
smaller amounts of resource taken than self-focused undergraduate students. In contrast, the 
business leaders in Study 2 managed to equal resource taking between the perspective taking 
conditions over time. 
Generally, however, groups failed to increase joint as well as individual outcomes, 
which would have been possible if they had allowed the resource to grow initially, thus 
allowing full capacity harvest over several trials. Except of a few rare occasions where groups 
managed to allow the level of the resource to increase from one trial to the next, all groups 
overharvested at the very beginning. Although the instruction was to take half of the resource 
as the maximum, all groups reduced the amount of the resource excessively at the beginning; 
50% was the sustainable level, whereas 74% of the resource were taken in Study 1 and 75% 
of the resource were taken in Study 2 in Trial 1. To avoid complete depletion, the task 
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additionally provided a good opportunity to increase the resource through conservative 
resource taking for a short period of time. However, none of the groups managed to 
substantially increase the resource levels.  
 
Limitations 
Although the attempt in Study 1 and Study 2 was to conduct a realistic negotiation 
scenario to be played interactively and simultaneously over time, limitations exist since no 
communication and face-to-face interaction was possible. On the one hand, this 
standardization allowed us to conduct the simulation in a lab scenario without any influences 
of participants’ communication, eye contact, gestures, mimicry, or attractiveness and 
persuasion. On the other hand, real negotiations regularly make use of social interactions 
(e.g., discussions) before final decisions are made. 
In general, undergraduate students’ lack of experience with business simulations and 
management decisions in Study 1 limits the generalizability of the results, especially since the 
majority of participants were students majoring in psychology. Furthermore, in Study 1 and 
Study 2, the requirement that participants perform the experiment in one session meant that 
they had to read and consider a rather large load of information. Although we deleted and 
simplified as much as possible, having to consider all the task procedures, goals, and 
information about the associations may have led participants to process the data less 
systematically and more heuristically instead. 
 
Future Research 
Future research should investigate influences on individuals’ behavior in resource 
dilemmas over time. For example, the assessment of communication among individuals seems 
necessary, since discussions potentially influence subsequent behavior (see Epley et al., 2006, 
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Study 1). Furthermore, subtle forms, such as eye gaze, gesture, and mimicry, as well as 
communication-associated aspects, such as physical attractiveness (e.g., Rosenblat, 2008; 
Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999) and persuasion (e.g., Davies, Goetz, & Shakelford, 2008), as 
well as minority influence (e.g., Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2007) are likely to influence 
negotiating. 
Besides no discussion during the negotiation being allowed, there was no opportunity 
to directly influence others’ (intended) behavior. Without the opportunity to socially interact, 
individuals could not give support in order to develop an ideal strategy at group level. Future 
research might investigate the processes that influence groups’ behavior, either cognitively 
(e.g., information processing; De Dreu, 2007; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Koole, 
& Steinel, 2000), affectively (e.g., emotion; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van 
Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; or trust; Naquin & Paulson, 
2003; see also Balliet & Van Lange, 2013a, 2013b), or behaviorally (e.g., backing up 
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WHEN A PURELY EGOTISTICAL INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT 
TAKE THE MOST: REACTIVE EGOISM IN DISPOSITION AND 







This chapter discusses the research presented in the previous chapters and includes an 
overview of the core findings. Next, a critical contemplation of perspective taking, social 
orientation, and their integration in the triangle hypothesis will be described as well as their 
limitations. At the end of this chapter, I describe the contributions of this dissertation to basic 
psychological knowledge and possible future research. 
Perspective taking as the ability of a “respondent to adopt the perspective, or point of 
view [of others]” (Davis, 1980, p. 6) helps to understand other people. At the first sight, to 
adopt other people’s perspective might seem to be a complaisant, empathetic behavior; as it 
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decreases egotistical self-centrism through consideration of others (Epley, Caruso, & 
Bazerman, 2006). However, considering other people’s perspective does not necessarily cause 
empathetic behavior but might lead to a biased prediction of others. Research has shown that 
individuals who take others’ perspective may predict others to be self-interested, particularly 
in (predicted) competitive negotiations. As a consequence, individuals increase their 
egoistical behavior reactively; an effect called reactive egoism (Epley et al., 2006). To 
demonstrate reactive egoism and to identify its dispositional and situational antecedents and 
its consequences over time with focus on individuals’ negotiation experience was the major 
aim of this dissertation. 
 
Overview of the Core Findings 
This dissertation investigates the origins and consequences of individuals’ behavior in 
social dilemmas caused by reactive egoism. The studies presented in the two chapters in the 
dissertation all shared a general 2 (dispositional perspective taking: perspective takers vs. non-
perspective takers; situational perspective taking: other-focused vs. self-focused) x 2 
(dispositional social orientation: prosocial vs. proself; situational social orientation: 
cooperative vs. competitive) design; except for Study 2 in Chapter 3, which included 
perspective taking as the only factor. 
In this dissertation, I examined reactive egoism evoked by perspective taking and 
social orientation in resource dilemmas. First, consideration of perspective taking and social 
orientation as dispositional characteristics in Study 1 and as situational characteristics in 
Study 2 in Chapter 2 deepens the understanding reactive egoism’s psychological bases. 
Previous research (Epley et al., 2006) was not able to separate influences of personality and 
situation on individuals’ behavior, and further neglected potential interaction effects. Second, 
elaboration of an ongoing negotiation using finitely repeated resource allocations in Study 1 
110 
 
and Study 2 in Chapter 3 allows the analysis of reactive egoism in simultaneous and 
interactively simulated negotiations for the first time. Third, participation of undergraduate 
students and individuals in a leadership position provides evidence that individuals’ behavior 
differs depending on experience with negotiation processes and expertise. Since I created 
dynamic resource allocations, individuals’ reaction to initial behavior could be analyzed over 
time.  
Study 1 in Chapter 2 (N = 183; undergraduate students) showed how individuals’ 
disposition influenced their behavior. Findings indicated that perspective takers and prosocial 
individuals cooperated more by appointing themselves a smaller amount of the resource than 
non-perspective takers and proself individuals did. Although the two dispositions perspective 
taking and social orientation differ in their psychological mechanisms and meanings, they are 
correlated in their ability to consider other individuals.  
Study 2 in Chapter 2 (N = 133; members of the general staff of the Swiss Armed 
Forces) confirmed that the two dispositional factors perspective taking and social orientation 
are correlated. Moreover, dispositional social orientation showed that prosocial individuals 
again cooperated more by taking a smaller amount of the resource than proself individuals 
did, irrespective of manipulated situational characteristics of the negotiation. Dispositional 
perspective taking no longer had any influence on individuals’ behavior. In this study, the 
negotiation was framed in a way that both perspective taking and social orientation were 
manipulated as situational characteristics of the negotiation. Situational perspective taking 
showed that individuals in the self-focused condition behaved consistently between 
predictions and behavior. In contrast, for individuals in the other-focused condition no 
consistency between predictions and behavior was found. These individuals reactively 
increased their egotistical behavior due to the predicted competitive behavior of others; i.e., 
reactive egoism occurred. Furthermore, the reactively increased egotistical behavior of other-
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focused individuals in cooperative negotiations might be caused by the uncertainty about 
whether others will cooperate. 
As an additional finding, the comparison of both studies in Chapter 2 revealed leaders 
in Study 2 to behave more competitive and to take a larger amount of the resource than 
undergraduate students in Study 1 did. These undergraduate students were only assigned to 
the high social power position by their role. Therefore, evidence for a discontinuity effect 
(Pinter et al., 2007), the effect that individuals high in social power behave more 
competitively in negotiations than individuals low in social power do, was observed. 
Study 1 and Study 2 in Chapter 3 investigated the influence of manipulated situational 
characteristics of perspective taking and social orientation on individuals’ behavior over time. 
Therefore, a finitely repeated dynamic resource allocation scenario was modeled and 
interactively simulated over multiple trials. 
Study 1 in Chapter 3 (N = 112; undergraduate students) demonstrated that perspective 
taking led other-focused individuals to predict others as self-interested and to reactively 
increase their egotistical behavior by allocating themselves a larger amount of the resource 
than self-focused individuals did; i.e., reactive egoism occurred. Interestingly, other-focused 
individuals showed ongoing reactive egoism and generated smaller amounts of the resource 
over time than self-focused individuals. Furthermore, this study showed that the framing of 
the negotiation as either cooperative or competitive had no influence on individuals’ behavior. 
As cooperation was beneficial in cooperative as well as in competitive negotiations by 
individuals’ goal to maximize their own outcomes over time, no difference in the amount of 
the resource taken was expected. Over time, however, long-term consequences of reactive 
egoism were shown in the other-focused condition in competitive negotiations without quota 
restrictions. These individuals ended with the least amount of the resource taken due to their 
failure to detach from reactively increased egotism that caused the depletion of the resource 
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more often. With quota restrictions, the effect the negotiation’s framing of cooperation and 
competition was absent.  
Study 2 in Chapter 3 (N = 60; business leaders from various organizations in Central 
Europe) confirmed the finding that individuals in the other-focused condition reactively 
increased their egotistical behavior by taking a larger amount of the resource than individuals 
in the self-focused condition did; i.e., reactive egoism occurred. However, reactive egoism 
vanished over time and individuals in the other-focused condition did not differ in the amount 
of the resource taken from individuals in the self-focused condition. Interestingly, a few 
individuals in the other-focused condition assumed that others would be cooperative, even 
though the negotiation was framed to be competitive. These individuals avoided the 
occurrence of reactive egoism but showed mutual cooperation, and, consequently, ended up 
with a larger amount of the resource taken over time than individuals in groups showing 
reactive egoism. This additional finding provides evidence that cooperation is possible even if 
the negotiation is framed to be competitive. However, further research is needed to identify 
whether the smaller group size in the negotiation, the participating business leaders’ expertise 
and experience with negotiation processes, or even other influences that were not taken into 
account in this research moderated this effect. 
 
Discussion and Limitations 
In this section I critically discuss the main psychological constructs in the 
dissertation’s theoretical background, perspective taking and social orientation, and their 







Dispositional perspective taking. In this dissertation, perspective taking is the major 
psychological construct of interest. In general, to measure dispositional perspective taking 
was my greatest difficulty due to the lack of an appropriate measure. Dispositional 
perspective taking indeed influenced individuals’ behavior only in the first study in which 
disposition was measured. In the following studies, when situational perspective taking was 
manipulated and dispositional perspective taking was assessed as a control variable, 
disposition no longer exerted any influence on individuals’ behavior in negotiations. Several 
explanations and possible improvements are listed in the following section. 
First, in Davis’s (1980) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), empathy is considered 
not only to be affective and cognitive but also to have an affective, health associated 
component (subscale personal distress) as well as a perceptual, media related component 
(subscale fantasy). Therefore, it remains unclear what empathy really is. There is good reason 
to assume that empathy is just affective and cognitive (or only affective as in early research 
on empathy). At the same time, there is also evidence to include more components for 
empathy, such as the two additional components by Davis (1980). According to Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright (2004), however, it should be obvious that these two components “are not 
empathy itself” (p. 166). This lack of understanding about the empathy construct might be 
overcome by a deductive method of scale construction once a final definition of empathy has 
been reached. 
Second, the IRI itself does not clearly separate its different components. The subscale 
perspective-taking ought to measure cognitive components of empathy, and the subscale 
emotional concern is supposed to measure affective components. However, in the subscale 
emotional concern, (affective) perspective taking is measured as well. Therefore, it is 
essential to clarify the definition and meaning of perspective taking and to elaborate a 
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theoretical differentiation of perspective taking and emotional concern. Conceivably, there 
may be a cognitive perspective taking subscale as well as an affective perspective taking 
subscale that apply to the proposed taxonomies, chronologically listed, by Underwood and 
Moore (1982), Eisenberg (1986), and Oswald (1996). 
Third, even if the ambiguity of affect and cognition can be resolved, it still remains 
unclear whether an empathetic person attains higher values on both affective and cognitive (or 
all four) subscales, or whether a high value on one subscale is sufficient to be an empathetic 
person, and in which subscale most importantly. There is a theoretical lack of explanation of 
what an empathetic person’s abilities have to consist of. This issue is not only crucial in 
research by Batson and Cialdini but also in the growing amount of research on empathy 
associated constructs such as, for example, accuracy by Hall and Schmid Mast (e.g., Hall, 
Andrzejewski, Murphy, Schmid Mast, & Feinstein, 2008; Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007) and its 
consequences on interpersonal sensitivity (e.g., Hall & Schmid Mast, 2008; Schmid Mast, 
Jonas, & Hall, 2009). 
Fourth, besides the previously described theoretical issues, several methodological 
difficulties exist. Primarily, responses to the items on the IRI might be conflicting and 
bewildering. As can be seen in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 in Chapter 1, not only are items often 
formulated imprecisely (e.g., “I try to…” in five of seven items in Table 1.1, or “I feel kind 
of…” and “I don’t feel very much…” in Table 1.2), but it also remains unclear if “trying” or 
“feeling kind of” is sufficient for the statements’ approval. However, even when respondents 
decide on this issue, the contradictory logic of the response format makes it difficult to 
respond adequately. For example, six items in total (two items in Table 1.1, four items in 
Table 1.2) use “sometimes” (or “often”, “not usually”) to assess the frequency of the 
cognitive or affective process. Instead of a response scale for indicating a degree of agreement 
on vaguely temporal parameters, a pure frequency measure (e.g., from never to always) might 
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not only make the scale easier to respond to but also improve the internal consistency of the 
scale itself (for statistics, see Davis, 1980). Furthermore, social desirability might strongly 
influence responses to the statements, since the items measure socially desired characteristics 
in general social interactions. 
This criticism might raise the question as to whether there are alternative measures of 
perspective taking. So far, an established measure of dispositional perspective taking does not 
exist. For measuring empathy more accurately, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) 
developed the Empathy Quotient (EQ). Like Davis (1980, 1983), Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright also considered empathy to be a multidimensional construct. However, their EQ 
considers empathy as a global construct in order to provide a reliable and easily assessable 
measure of empathy. Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, and David (2004) found 
significant correlations of the EQ (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) with the IRI’s (Davis, 
1980) two subscales emotional concern (affective component; r = .42, p = .025) and 
perspective-taking (cognitive component; r = .49, p = .009). However, no correlations were 
found for the other two IRI subscales personal distress and fantasy. This finding follows the 
argument by Lawrence et al. (2004) that emotional concern and perspective-taking measure 
empathy more closely than the other two subscales. These other two subscales, according to 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, do not measure empathy itself but rather consequences of 
empathetic behavior. The small number of participants (n = 28) in the study by Lawrence et 
al. (2004), however, makes generalizations about the scales’ intercorrelation difficult. 
Situational perspective taking. As a consequence of these major methodological 
issues, I manipulated perspective taking as situational characteristic of the negotiation to 
investigate individuals’ behavior in negotiations; with Study 1 in Chapter 2 being an 
exception. The manipulation of situational perspective taking was in accordance with Epley et 
al.’s (2006) procedure: Self-focused individuals were asked to indicate their decision directly 
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(i.e., behavior), and other-focused individuals were instructed to consider others’ perspective 
first (i.e., predictions) before deciding (i.e., behavior).  
However, slight modifications to Epley et al.’s (for comparison, 2006, p. 875) 
instructions were needed. First, I paraphrased and shortened the instructions, since in Epley et 
al.’s (2006) experiments, information was provided in advance and then recalled at the 
experiment, whereas in my experiments, participants had to learn all the information at the 
experiment, and, therefore, their cognitive capacity was critical. Further, I changed the 
predicted target by considering “other individuals” instead of “other groups,” since in my 
studies, individuals all acted as representatives of associations without knowing who was 
acting in the same simulation (Study 1 and Study 2 in Chapter 2) or who was acting as the 
respective representative of the respective other associations (Study 1 and Study 2 in Chapter 
3). In the studies by Epley et al. (2006), participants either had a group discussion or were 
informed that they were physically interacting with other group members. Further, in contrast 
to Epley et al.’s (2006) procedure, by instructing participants to take others’ perspective, I 
framed different “intentions and interests” rather than appointed “priorities.” Priorities may 
have confused participants, as priorities were all instructed the same within groups, whereas 
the intentions and interests could differ for each association (i.e., asymmetric dilemmas in 
Study 1 and Study 2 in Chapter 3). 
 
Social Orientation 
Dispositional social orientation. In contrast to perspective taking, social (value) 
orientation as a disposition predicts a person’s behavior in resource allocations much more 
precisely. With the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange, Otten, De 
Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), a well-established measure of dispositional social orientation 
exists. It measures an individual’s social preference for outcome distribution through nine 
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forced-choice items, displayed in matrices in which points must be allocated between oneself 
and another fictitious person. I used the two-category schema of social orientation 
(disposition: prosocial vs. proself) as a fit for my negotiation manipulation (situation: 
cooperative vs. competitive). However, other taxonomies of dispositional social orientation 
have been defined in the last decades (for an overview, see Van Lange, 1999), and new 
measures were developed very recently (e.g., “slider measure”; Murphy & Ackermann, 2013). 
Whereas some types of dispositional social orientation are more theoretical in nature (e.g., the 
nihilistic orientation), the altruistic orientation and the aggressive orientation require further 
discussion, as they have not been considered in the studies in this dissertation.9  
First, altruism represents an individual’s preference for maximizing the other person’s 
outcomes. A scientific debate between Batson and Cialdini on the nature of altruism 
continued for decades. Batson argues that altruism, evoked by empathy (“empathy-altruism 
hypothesis”; for an overview, see Batson & Powell, 2003) is inherent in human mankind and 
serves evolutionary functions. Cialdini, however, argues that altruism always possesses an 
egotistical component, at least to some extent. According to the “negative-state relief 
explanation” (Cialdini et al., 1987), individuals benefit from empathetically reacting to a 
negative state when seeing another person’s suffering. The debate will not be evaluated or 
judged here. Nevertheless, possible consequences must be considered.  
According to Batson’s argumentation, altruism is inherent for human mankind’s 
survival. This argument is unlikely to be relevant for the present research. In the social 
dilemmas, participants simply acted as representatives of a commercial industry. Thus, the 
participants could expect no real-life consequences. Furthermore, to be altruistic, the 
                                                           
9
 The Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange et al., 1997) would have categorized an altruistic 
individual as prosocial and an aggressive individual as competitive or as proself, respectively.  
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individual should know the other’s interests or needs first. As I used social dilemmas, 
collective interests are in conflict with one’s own interests. Since Batson considers altruism as 
acting toward others’ interests solely, this behavior, however, could apparently not be 
displayed due to the social dilemma’s structure itself.  
Cialdini’s argument that altruism always includes an egotistical component might be 
relevant for the social dilemma, at least in its asymmetrical version. In asymmetrical 
dilemmas, interests differ for each participant. As a consequence, one representative gains by 
taking a large amount of the resource, whereas another representative benefits by taking a 
lesser amount of the resource. However, this opportunism does not reflect altruism. Altruism 
differs from cooperation in that altruistic individuals do not expect any outcomes for 
themselves, but in cooperation reciprocity is expected. Consequently, maximizing another’s 
outcome in social dilemmas does not necessarily reflect altruism but it is more likely to reflect 
an expected cooperation.  
Second, aggression is a social orientation in which an individual’s preference is to 
minimize another’s outcomes with no regard to own outcomes. There might be situations in 
which an individual’s preference is for the other person to receive nothing. This might be the 
case, for example, after a break-up in a romantic relationship or in legal affairs. However, 
economic social interactions as conducted in the social dilemmas differ from these examples 
in two ways. For one, the former two examples are evoked by emotional causes (e.g., anger, 
frustration, or sadness), but in my studies, the social dilemmas are based on cognitive 
components. For another, the goal to minimize another’s outcome often forces the individual 
to spend resources (e.g., money or time) to reach the goal of minimizing another’s outcome. 
However, in the dissertation’s studies, the structure of social dilemmas did not allow 
diminishing another’s outcomes.  
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Since my interest in social orientation concerns its influence in negotiations, 
participants’ own interests in outcomes of the resource allocation are essential. The individual 
gain in altruism and aggression, in contrast, strongly depends on (no) resource allocation to 
the other person. 
Situational social orientation. Alternatively, I manipulated social orientation (Study 2 
in Chapter 2 and Study 1 in Chapter 3) to investigate situational factors of social orientation 
on individuals’ behavior in negotiations. Again, I manipulated social orientation according to 
the procedure by Epley et al. (2006). Whereas in cooperative negotiations individuals were 
instructed to attain the highest joint outcome, in competitive negotiations each individual was 
instructed to reach the highest outcome for himself. Here again, I paraphrased and shortened 
the instruction in contrast to Epley et al. (2006). Further, I modified the instruction for 
cooperative negotiations. I used “joint outcome” instead of “team score,” since in my 
experiments no team was formed and resources were generated as outcomes instead of scores. 
Again, the procedure of manipulating situational characteristics of the negotiation according 
to the cooperative or competitive orientation was mainly successful. Nevertheless, 
dispositional social orientation still influenced individuals’ behavior. Thus, a congruence of 
disposition (i.e., trait) and situation (i.e., state) seems to be present for social orientation – 
whereas this congruence is absent for perspective taking. 
 
“Triangle” Hypothesis 
Reconsidering social orientation, its classification may be assigned to a two-category 
schema (i.e., prosocial and proself) or a three-category schema (i.e., cooperative, 
individualistic, and competitive). According to the “triangle” hypothesis by Kelley and 
Stahelski (1970), cooperators assume that others are either cooperative or competitive, but 
competitors predict that others are competitive only. So, what about individualistic individuals 
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and their prediction about others? Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) examined this empirical 
lack concerning the individualistic orientation and others’ predicted social orientation. Their 
study indicates that cooperators are the least motivated to compete, and that competitors have 
the least motivation to cooperate. Individualism intermediated ratings in both measures, 
indicating a different pattern in the three-category schema. However, the aggregation of 
individualistic and competitive individuals to a proself category is theoretically defensible, 
since “prosocials expect others to be more cooperative than do individualists and competitors” 
(i.e., personality; Van Lange et al., 1997, p. 734).  
Furthermore, other reasons exist about as to why this issue did not affect the findings 
of the studies in this dissertation. First, I manipulated situational characteristics of the 
negotiation to be either cooperative or competitive. Individuals’ behavior might be formed by 
the framing of “the motivational structure of these particular games” (i.e., situation; Kuhlman 
& Wimberley, 1976, p. 81). This procedure allowed me to compare situational social 
orientation (cooperative vs. competitive) with dispositional social orientation (prosocial vs. 
proself). As a consequence, the framing in the social dilemma was consistently either 
cooperative or competitive (except for Study 2 in Chapter 3, which included competitive 
negotiations as the only negotiation condition). Second, individuals’ behavior might be 
formed by others’ predicted cooperative or competitive behavior (i.e., others’ predicted 
personality; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Therefore, the two-category schema allowed me to 
compare others’ predicted social orientation (from cooperative to competitive) with 
dispositional social orientation (prosocial vs. proself). For that reason, I constantly used 
dispositional social orientation in the two-category schema; its three-category schema was 





Contributions and Future Research 
This dissertation investigated influences of perspective taking and social orientation, 
dispositional as well as situational, on individuals’ behavior over time. I succeeded in 
demonstrating that individuals’ motivation to take others’ perspective as well as individuals’ 
social preferences for outcome distribution influenced their subsequent behavior in social 
dilemmas. Moreover, when measuring perspective taking and social orientation as 
dispositions, the two constructs are correlated. Participants displayed the same behavior when 
being prosocial or other-focused as well as when being proself or self-focused. Further, I 
succeeded in demonstrating that situational factors influenced individuals’ behavior and that 
personality interacted with situational factors. 
By using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), which has rarely been used in 
psychological research up to now, to provide interactive, simultaneous assessment of various 
individuals’ behavior within the negotiation on resource allocation, a dynamic and more 
realistic scenario was investigated. Further, due to the negotiation’s manipulation of 
situational characteristics over time, I succeeded in demonstrating that reactive egoism also 
occurs in long-term negotiations. Furthermore, due to participating undergraduate students as 
well as leaders in the economy and military, I succeeded in demonstrating that individuals’ 
behavior over time depended on their experience with negotiation processes and expertise.  
Future research might make use of this approach to investigate individuals’ behavior 
in social dilemmas in more detail. Apart from the constructs investigated in this research, 
perspective taking and social orientation, other predictors and moderators are likely to 
influence individuals’ behavior. Since my aim was to contribute new insights for the proposed 
psychological constructs, I had to standardize other possible influences. In this dissertation, an 
extensive, rather theoretical knowledge concerning the effect of reactive egoism was 
developed. At the same time, various standardizations limit the generalization of the findings 
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in this dissertation’s studies. Therefore, providing practical implications is critical. 
Nevertheless, possible extensions for future research will be proposed in the following 
section. 
First, communication among negotiators was not allowed during interactions for 
standardization. Since discussions might influence subsequent behavior (see Epley et al., 
2006, Study 1), there is good reason to assume that communication among individuals will 
not only change their own behavior but others’ behavior as well. Thus, exploring the 
influence of communication (for an introduction, see Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & 
Roseborough, 1951) and its subtle forms (e.g., mimicry; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008), 
as well as communication-associated aspects, such as physical attractiveness (e.g., Rosenblat, 
2008; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999) and persuasion (e.g., Davies, Goetz, & Shakelford, 2008), 
as well as minority influence (e.g., Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2007) on individuals’ 
behavior might be important for future research. 
For example, in the present studies’ social dilemma, discussion would have allowed 
individuals to share information, evaluate and discuss strategies, and convince others to act in 
their proposed direction – independent of whether this strategy was self-interested or not. To 
investigate effects of information sharing might aid investigation and understanding of 
individuals’ behavior in more detail. On the one side, there is good reason to assume that 
discussion helps recognizing that there is eventually a drastic decrease in the resource and 
consequently helps identifying a common strategy to prevent depletion of the resource. On the 
other side, there is evidence that discussion even increases egotistical behavior (i.e., 
strengthens reactive egoism) due to individuals focusing on others’ behavior instead of 
focusing on the social dilemma, as demonstrated in Study 1 by Epley et al. (2006). 
Second, besides no discussion during interactions being allowed, there was no 
opportunity to directly influence others’ (intended) behavior. Without the opportunity to 
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communicate, participants could not give any advice in order to develop an ideal strategy. 
Thus, future research might investigate the processes that influence the formation of a group’s 
strategy and behavior, either cognitively (e.g., information processing; De Dreu, 2007; De 
Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000), affectively (emotion; e.g., 
Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004; or trust; e.g., Naquin & Paulson, 2003; see also Balliet & Van Lange, 2013a, 
2013b), or behaviorally (e.g., backing up behavior; Porter, Gogus, & Yu, 2010). For example, 
the opportunity to provide task-related effort, called “backing up behavior” (Porter et al., 
2003), may help individuals struggling with their role, the setting of the task, or the choice of 
an adequate strategy to attain instructed goals. Backing up behavior includes verbal activities 
but also cognitive and behavioral activities (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001) and could 
then be analyzed in terms of individuals (i.e., personality) but also in terms of “the nature of 
the team’s task situation” (i.e., situation; Porter et al., 2003, p. 392) that consequently could 
improve joint outcomes (Porter, Gogus, & Yu, 2011).  
In the social dilemma of the present studies, for example, backing up behavior might 
avoid some individuals’ failure to adequately react to a decrease of the resource – likely 
caused by reactive egoism. A change in strategy through backing up behavior would allow the 
resource to increase over time and consequently would lead to higher joint outcomes (and 
higher individual outcomes) in social dilemmas. Therefore, backing up behavior might help to 
overcome the phenomenon called entrapment, a “decision making [pattern] that does not 
change, despite an escalation of loss” (Fietkau & Trénel, 1999, in “Summary”). 
Third, the simulation of the resource allocation required participants to negotiate for 
the entire duration and with full transparency of their behavior. In other negotiation research, 
for example, participants had the opportunity to benefit or punish others (e.g., Batson et al., 
1995), to behave aggressively or unethically (e.g., Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 
124 
 
2013), or they could even quit the negotiation in unsolvable impasses or finish when 
agreement was reached (e.g., Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 
2011). Future research might consider possible influences of possible break ups, potential 
exploitation of others, or hindrances during negotiations. 
In the present studies’ social dilemma, for example, participants were not allowed to 
quit the negotiation, neither if they attained their individual goal nor if they recognized the 
impossibility of attaining it. Participants’ wish to quit the negotiation or to replace others who 
did not follow the common or self-interested strategy was likely present in the studies. The 
option to leave or to dismiss the negotiation, to replace others, or to even allow individuals to 
decide on the composition of representatives in the negotiation might furthermore improve the 
negotiation scenario to make it even more realistic and might be an interesting field for future 
research. 
Fourth, in addition to investigating intragroup processes, as described so far, 
intergroup negotiations might also be simulated (e.g., Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Aaldering, 
Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013, Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-Marín, 2009). 
Composing groups quasi-experimentally to observe not only intragroup behavior but also 
intergroup behavior (for participants’ social orientation, see Steinel et al., 2009) might be a 
promising field for future research. This research would not only provide new insights into 
intergroup research but also elevate the lately somewhat ignored research on the triangle 
hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelsky, 1970; see also Idiema & Poppe, 1994, 1995, 1999) and on 
social uncertainty (Wit & Wilke, 1998) when examining at the (inter)group level (see also 
Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). 
In a social dilemma with intergroup negotiation, for example, the intragroup 
constellation of group members and their dispositional social orientation might influence not 
only subsequent group behavior but also groups’ belief of outgroup members’ dispositional 
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social orientation and likely behavior. This would allow investigation of reactive egoism and 
social uncertainty at the intergroup level and may increase the reality of negotiations. 
Finally, in future research the negotiation task might also be modified. I used resource 
dilemmas which allowed participants to make use of a shared resource, but modifications of 
this type of social dilemma, or even other types of social dilemmas, would have been 
possible. I succeeded in modifying group size (three vs. four), task structure (symmetric vs. 
asymmetric), and assessment (single vs. multi; separately vs. simultaneously; one trial vs. 
multiple trials) in this dissertation’s studies, future research, however, might use other types 
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